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NOTES

CURED MEAT AND IDAHO POTATOES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PROTECTION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS OF
FOODSTUFFS
Lilian V. Faulhaber*
I. INTRODUCTION
Twelve centuries after monks living near the French village of Roquefort-surSoulzon presented Charlemagne with a wedge of "soft, fat, somewhat friable cheese,
showing veins and dots of greenish black and white color,"' Roquefort continues to
be considered the "king of cheeses" by many. 2 This foodstuff is still produced in the
natural caves of Le Combalou, adjacent to the town of Roquefort-sur-Soulzon,
primarily by members of La Socit6 Anonyme des Caves et des Producteurs Runis
de Roquefort ("La Socirt6"). 3 Approximately

1600 tons of this foodstuff are

produced annually. 4 According to various culinary experts, the unique flavor of
Roquefort requires three elements: the use of sheep's milk, the inoculation with the
Penicillium roqueforti that grows inside the caves of Le Combalou, and the special
maturing conditions of these caves. 5 Over the years, however, many producers of
blue-veined cheeses that do not meet these requirements have attempted to profit
from the reputation of this celebrated cheese by labeling their own products
"Roquefort." In 1925, the French government endeavored to prohibit such freeriding through the passage of a law limiting the Roquefort designation to cheese
* J.D., Harvard Law School. 2005. Special thanks to Professor Peter Murray for his comments on
the many drafts of this Note. The author also wishes to thank Mark Szpak at Ropes & Gray and Eleanor
Meltzer at the United States Patent and Trademark Office for their assistance in researching this Note, as
well as Bettina Clark and Michael Pyle for their editorial comments. All errors are those of the author.
1 Douglas v. Newark Cheese Co.. 274 N.Y.S. 406,407 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1934).
2 See "Roquefort," in The Food Lover's Companion, at www.epicurious.com (last visited April 4,
2004) ("If not the "king of cheeses" as many proclaim, Roquefort is at least one of the oldest and best
known in the world"). Epicures differ on which cheese is worthy of this title, with some arguing for
Roquefort, others for Stilton, and still others for Parmigiano-Reggiano. See, e.g.. Alan Davidson,
Roquefort, in The Oxford Companion to Food 670, 670 (1999) (referring to Stilton as "one of the three
most famous blue cheeses of the world" along with Roquefort and Gorgonzola); Jeffrey Steingarten, Fear
of Formaggio, in It Must Have Been Something I Ate 77, 81 (2002) (referring to Parmesan as "this most
perfect of cheeses").
See Davidson, supra note 2, at 670. La Socidt6 was formed in 1842. Id.
4 See id.
5 Id.
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produced in the region of Roquefort-sur-Soulzon. 6 Thus was born one of the earliest
geographic indications.
Geographic indications, as defined by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement"), are "indications which
identify a good as originating in the territory of a member or region or locality in that
territory where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin." 7 While Roquefort may be one of
the more famous examples, geographic indications abound, including "Idaho" for
potatoes, "Parma" for prosciutto and "Vidalia" for onions.
The term "geographic indications" will be used in this Note to include both
protected designations of origin ("PDOs") and protected geographic indications
("PGIs"). Although the European Union defines PDOs as having a more direct link
8
between the geographical region and the quality of the good produced there,
producers and consumers of all foodstuffs protected by geographic indications argue9
region.
that the quality of the foodstuff is directly attributable to the geographical
Furthermore, even those regimes that differentiate between PDOs and PGIs extend
protections to both, thereby effectively conflating the two into one category of
geographic indications.
Geographic indications are often used to sell wine, spirits and foodstuffs, but
they can also distinguish certain human factors associated with a geographical area,
such as traditional methods of manufacture.' 0 Their value to producers lies in three
primary areas: as source identifiers, identifying goods as originating in a particular
region; as indicators of quality, alerting consumers to the fact that goods originate
from an area known for its quality or reputation; and as business interests, promoting

6 See Douglas, 274 N.Y.S. at 407. While Roquefort obtained its designation of origin in 1925, it
was initially protected by the Law for the Protection of the Place of Origin of May 6, 1919, which created
the system of appellations d'origine controlle (AOCs). Kazuko Masui and Tomoko Yamada, French
Cheeses 77 (1996).
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 14, 1994, art. 22(1),
LT/UR/A- I C/IP/I [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
' See infra text accompanying notes 44-48.
9 While the characteristics and quality of certain foodstuffs may initially appear to be less directly
linked to the geographic region from which they originate, a study of literature addressing such
characteristics and quality contradicts this initial appearance. See, e.g., James Beard. The New James
Beard 584 (1981) ("The brown-skinned Idaho is our most dependable potato. Grown in lava soil, it is
extremely mealy and bakes perfectly."); R.W. Apple Jr.. For Baking, For Mashing, Forever. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 19, 2003, at Fl ("With cool nights, warm days, volcanic soil, low rainfall and ample water for
irrigation, Idaho proved to be the ideal place to grow... Burbank russets, known today to most Americans
simply as Idahos."); Davidson, supra note 2, at 670 (attributing the unique flavor of Roquefort to the use
of sheep's milk, the inoculation with the Penicillium roqueforti that grows only inside the caves of Le
Combalou and the special maturing conditions of these caves); Davidson, "Wild Rice," in The Oxford
Companion to Food, supra note 2. at 848, 848 (quoting Artemas Ward as describing the "peculiar, slightly
smoky flavor" wild rice and as describing its harvesting "[in northern Minnesota"); Davidson. "Onions,"
in The Oxford Companion to Food, supra note 2, at 556. 556 ("hybrid onions include a couple of
American favourites, both of the Yellow Granex type: Vidalia, named for the town in Georgia around
which growing is concentrated; and Maui. named for the Hawaiian island in whose volcanic soil and cool
climate this onion is at its sweetest"); Irma S. Rombauer and Marion Rombauer Becker. Joy of Cooking,
297 (1997) (defining Parmigiano-Reggiano as a "mouth-filling cow's milk cheese with a complex and
pleasing aftertaste [that] is made in a small, legally-designated area of Emilio-Romagna in northern
Italy").
I'( P. Kanagavel, Intellectual Property Rights: A Comprehensive Overview, 85 J. Pat. & Trademark
Off. Soc'y 663. 78 (2003).
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the goods of a particular area.'' As a press release from the European Union
emphasized, the protection of geographic indications is necessary "to ensure that
producers and consumers get a fair deal.'" 1
While the general concept of protecting geographically-significant products
from competition has existed for centuries, 13 the protection provided to geographic
indications varies significantly, both between countries and according to the product
being protected. Although the TRIPS Agreement, which entered into force on
January I, 1995, has moved toward harmonizing the standards of protection and
enforcement at the international level,' 4 the effects of this agreement are still fairly
limited in that it offers a two-tier system of protection. Wines and spirits are offered
additional protection under Article 23, which protects against any use for products
not originating in the location indicated by the geographic indication., 5 All other
products, including foodstuffs, fall under Article 22, which only protects against the
misleading use of a geographic indication. 16 This difference means that, while any
use of the term "Cognac" to refer to a product that does not originate in the protected
region is per se unlawful, use of the term "Parmigiano Reggiano" will not be deemed7
unlawful until it has been proven that the specific designation misled consumers.,
Protection of geographically significant foodstuffs thus requires that producers meet
a burden of proof not required of producers of geographically-significant wines and
spirits.
Two entities that offer greater protection to geographic indications of foodstuffs
than that provided under Article 22 are the European Union ("EU") and the United
States. Since the protection of foodstuffs in both Europe and America is a less settled
area of law than the protection of wines and spirits, 18 this Note will explore the
different protection and enforcement of geographic indications of foodstuffs in the
European Union and the United States. While this comparison is itself valuable
given current uncertainty as to whether the EU or U.S. approach would prevail if the
TRIPS Agreement was expanded to grant foodstuffs greater international protection,
it also highlights fundamental differences between Europe and America - and
predicts significant changes that could arise in the event of future harmonization of
the protection of geographic indications.
Id. at 677-78.
- Press Release, European Union. WTO Talks: EU steps up bid for better protection of regional
quality products (Aug. 28, 2003) (on file with author).
" See "'When is a Trademark not a Trademark? When is it a Geographical Indicator?" INTA
International Meeting 3 (referring to the seventeenth-century East India Company profiting from
geographic indications).
14 Kanagavel, supra note 10. at 685-86.
'- Burkhart Goebel, Geographical Indications and Trademarks - The Road from Doha. 93
Trademark Rep. 964, 968 (2003).
16 Id. at 967.
'7 See id. at 967.
'8 Both Europe and America are similar to the TRIPS Agreement in that they both have two-tier
approaches that favor the protection of wines and spirits over that of foodstuffs. See Council Regulation
2081/92, 1992 O.J. (L 208), preamble [hereinafter 2081/92] (referring to "existing Community legislation
on wines and spirit drinks, which provide for a higher level of protection"); Jim Chen, A Sober Second
Look at Appellations of Origin: How the United States Will Crash France's Wine and Cheese Party, 5
Minn. J. Global Trade 29, 42 (1996) (noting that "'the United States confines appellations of origin to
wine," which is regulated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, within the Department of the
Treasury).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. I I

Although both the United States and the European Union have chosen to protect
these designations at the federal or EU level, both have approached this area of
intellectual property quite differently. The distinct systems they have developed to
protect geographic indications reveal more than just different approaches to
foodstuff protection. By comparing these two systems, this Note provides insights on.
continuing differences in European and American approaches to federalism, as well
as the treatment of consumers and producers in these two entities. While a
comparison of intellectual property protection may not appear to implicate federal
issues, marks protecting geographic indications are unique in that they are by their
definition localized. By permitting sub-federal entities such as states and Member
States to protect such products, the United States and the European Union must
consequently address issues of state and federal power that are not necessarily
associated with the protection of other marks. Moreover, the issue of whether to
grant any protection raises the issues of consumer and producer protection. While
producers generally want the highest possible level of protection for their own
products, consumers prefer a market free of protection, where competition ideally
lowers prices and ensures consumer choice. In choosing between these demands, the
EU and U.S. have also revealed their preference for either consumer or producer
protection. As will be shown in this Note, however, this preference is tied to the
aforementioned attitudes toward federalism and must be considered when creating
an international regime for geographic indications of foodstuffs.
As will be outlined in Parts II and III, the European Union and the United States
have each adopted a system to protect geographic indications at the federal level that
combines government regulation with judicial enforcement. In order to account for
this combined judicial-regulatory approach, this Note will outline the regulatory
schemes before focusing on representative cases brought before the European Court
of Justice ("ECJ") and various American federal courts in order to determine how
these schemes are implemented, applied and enforced in actuality. Part II will
address the European Union, while Part III will focus on the United States. Each of
these sections will analyze the respective European and American cases and
regulations in order to glean general lessons from each region, before Part IV
compares the two approaches in order to shed light on the larger lessons of
federalism and producer protection that can be seen through the lens of geographic
indication protection. Part V will conclude the Note.
II. EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS
Prior to 1993, protection of geographic indications within Europe took place on
a national level. In the words of the ECJ, geographic indications were historically
protected "by national provisions which were published and applied, in principle,
only on the territory of the Member State which had adopted them, subject to
international conventions extending protection to the territory of other Member
States by common agreement of the contracting parties."' 9 In 1993, Regulation
208 1/92 entered into force and shifted this protection to the European level, thereby
involving the ECJ in the enforcement of geographic indications. After detailing the

19Consorzio del Prosciutto de Parma and Salumificio S. Rita SpA v. Asda Stores Ltd. and Hygrade
Foods Ltd., Case C-108/01, 2003 E.C.R. 00. para. 98.
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historical enforcement of geographic indications, Part 1I will first outline the
protections available under Regulation 2081/92 and will then present the cases
before the ECJ relating to this legislation. This section will conclude with a
comparison of the European cases in order to ascertain the lessons to be learned from
the EU's approach.
A. HistoricalBackground
Throughout the twentieth century, nations within Europe attempted to protect
producers of foodstuffs with a particular connection to the country of origin. In 1925,
in order to prevent competitors from unfairly benefiting from the reputation acquired
by one such foodstuff, the French Republic passed a law that prohibited any
manufacturer from labeling a cheese as "Roquefort" unless such cheese had been
manufactured entirely from sheep's milk in the Roquefort District of France." This
law, which grew out of the Law for the Protection of the Place of Origin of May 6,
1919, 2 1 then expanded into France's system of appellations d'origine controlre
("AOCs"). 2 Under this system, the use of an AOC, which often confers significant
economic benefits to the foodstuffs to which it is attached, is restricted to products
processed in the same region where the raw agricultural commodity is produced. 23 In
order to be labeled Roquefort under the AOC system, a blue-veined cheese thus must
be both made from the milk of sheep in the region of Roquefort-sur-Soulzon and
must itself be processed and aged in that region. 24
Once a producer is found to qualify for an AOC, that producer is entitled to
certain rights relative to those who do not meet the requirements of the AOC.
According to France's Code de la Consommation, favored producers are granted the
right to produce and market an AOC-protected foodstuff; rights and claims against
producers who misappropriate the AOC; the power to challenge an AOC not granted
in accordance with previously established geographic criteria; and immunity against
the transformation of an AOC into a generic label. 25 Under this fourth benefit,
once a
26
foodstuff is granted AOC status, it can never fall into the public domain.
While AOCs were not unique to France, 27 such strong protection was not
uniformly present throughout the European Union. In the United Kingdom, for
example, producers of geographically-significant foodstuffs had little protection
under national law. Not only did England not have a specific system for the
protection of geographic indications, but it did not even have a general law of unfair
competition. 28
21 See Douglas v. Newark Cheese Co.. 274 N.Y.S. 406 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1934).
2' Masui and Yamada. supra note 6. at 77.
22 Note that AOC protection now takes place by way of the EU registration system. See infra text
accompanying notes 104-09.
23 See Chen. supra note 18. at 29.
24 This requirement explains why culinary experts are able to credit the flavor of Roquefort to three
elements: the use of sheep's milk, the inoculation with the Penicillium roqueforti that grows inside the
caves of Le Combalou. adjacent to Roquefort-sur-Soulzon, and the special maturing conditions within
these caves. See Davidson, supra note 2. 670.
21 Chen, supra note 18, at37-38.
26 See id. at 38.
27 See id. at 30 ("AOCs are commonplace in the civilian legal systems of Catholic Europe").
28 See Norma Dawson, Locating Geographical Indications - Perspectives from English Law, 90

Trademark Rep. 590, 593 (2000). Although Dawson suggests that this weak protection may be due to

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. I I

Due to the principle of territoriality, such national differences posed a severe
limitation to the protection of geographic indications beyond national borders.
Before 1993, ECJ case law stated that protection of geographic indications was
limited to the state that granted the protection.2 9 The French AOC system could not,
therefore, prevent an English producer of a cheese that did not meet the AOC

specifications for Roquefort from marketing this product as Roquefort within
England. Only when this producer attempted to export the cheese to France would
France's stringent protections take effect.

Further complicating the purely national regimes existing in Europe was the
two-tiered form of protection that many of these systems provided. In strongly
protective countries such as France and Spain, geographic indications as such were
never defined in statutes or regulations. Instead, protection of these labels was
divided into two separate approaches: protection of indications of provenance and
protection of designations of origin. 3 1 Indications of provenance ["Indication of
provenance," like "designation of origin," is a term of art, which I'm defining in this
sentence. This should not be changed.] , which were meant merely to inform
consumers of the place from which the product originated, were protected by "rules
designed to suppress misleading advertising, or indeed the abusive exploitation of
another's reputation." 32 Designations of origin, in contrast, informed consumers that
the product originated in a certain geographical area and that it adhered to certain
quality standards.: These latter indications, which included French AOCs, were

protected by stricter regimes.
In response to the problems inherent in the existence of multiple regimes within
Europe, a network of international agreements arose to supplement these national

protections. Under the 1951 International Convention on the Use of Designations of
Origin and Names for Cheeses, known as the Stresa Convention, producers are
prohibited from using "all specifications which constitute false information as to the

origin, variety, nature or specific qualities of.. cheeses."35 More broadly, the 1958
Lisbon Agreement

for the Protection

of Appellations

of Origin and

their

England "possessing few native geographic indications of major economic significance." it is instrnctive
to note that the United Kingdom registered sixteen foodstuffs such as White Stilton cheese and Buxton
blue under Regulation 2081/92. Dawson, supra note 28. at 593; see Council Regulation 1107/96, 1996
O.J. (L 148) [hereinafter 1107/961.
29See Kingdom of Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany and French Republic v. Commission.
Joined Cases 289/96, C-293/96 and C-299/96. 1999 E.C.R. 1-01541, para. 69, citing Exportur SA v. LOR
SA and Confiserie du Tech SA, Case C-3/91. 1992 E.C.R. 1-5529, para. 12.
3oSee Exportur, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5529 at para. 12 ("...protection of indications of provenance and
designations of origin is governed by the law of the country where protection is sought (the country of
importation) and not by that of the country of origin. Protection is thus determined by the law of the
country of importation").
31See id., para. 1I.
32 Id.

33Id.
.4See id. (referring to "special rules laid down in the statutes or regulations by which they [the
designations of origin] are established").
35Jenny Mosca. Recent Development. The Battle Between the Cheeses Signifies the Ongoing
Struggle to Protect Designations of Origin within the European Community and in the United States in
Consorzio per laTutela del Formaggio Gorgonzola v. Kaserei Champignon Hofineister GMBH & Co.
KG. 8 Tul. I. Int'l & Comp. L. 559,570 (2000).
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International Registration established an international registration system for
AOCs.36

Alongside these multilateral agreements, many nations within Europe signed
bilateral accords granting recognition to one another's national protections. These
agreements included a 1952 agreement between the Austrian and Italian
governments to protect substantial and compelling national interests in preventing
unfair competition between Member States; 37 a 1972 convention between the
Republic of Austria and the Kingdom of Greece relating to the protection of
indications of provenance, designations of origin and names of agricultural, craft and
industrial products; 38 and a 1973 convention between the French Republic and the
Spanish State on the protection39 of designations of origin, indications of provenance
and names of certain products.
These international agreements were not sufficient to harmonize the disparate
national systems within the European Union. Instead, by the 1990s, some Member
States still protected geographic indications much more strongly than did others and,
apart from those situations in which the country of origin was party to an applicable
international convention or bilateral agreement, these protections applied only to
products sold within the country. It was in this context that the institutions of the
European Union created a Community approach to the protection of geographic
indications of foodstuffs.
B.Regulation 2081/92
On July 14, 1992, the Council of Ministers of the European Union passed
Regulation 2081/92 on the protection of geographic indications and designations of

origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs ("2081/92"). 40 The Regulation went
into effect on July 25, 1993.4 ' This regulation was based on the agricultural
protection power conferred to the Council under Article 37 (ex Article 43) of the

Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty").42 The Council justified
See id. at note 90.
37See id. at 570.
38 See Kingdon of Denmark, Federal Republic o"Germany and French Republic v.Commission,
1999 E.C.R. 1-01541 at para. 27.
31 See Exportur, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5529 at para. 4.
4" See Council Regulation 2081/92.
41 See Kingdom of Denmark Federal Republic of Germany and French Republic v.
Commission,
1999 E.C.R. 1-01541 at para. 6.
42 For the sake of clarity, after providing readers with one parenthetical reference to an Article's old
numbering, this Note will refer to Articles in the EC Treaty according to their numbering in the Treaty of
Amsterdam that went into effect on May 1,1999. Although many of the cases and regulations discussed
herein were written prior to this date, and thus refer to the Articles according to the previous numbering
system, all Articles will be numbered according to the new system. Article 37 established the EU's
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). See 2081/92, preamble. The Council stated that "as part of the
adjustment of the common agricultural policy the diversification of agricultural production should be
encouraged so as to achieve a better balance between supply and demand on the markets [and that] the
promotion of products having certain characteristics could be of considerable benefit to the rural
economy, in particular to less-favored or remote areas, by improving the incomes of farmers and by
retaining the rural population in these areas." 2081/92, preamble. The Council also noted that "it has been
observed in recent years that consumers are tending to attach greater importance to the quality of
foodstuffs [and that] this quest for specific products generates a growing demand for agricultural products
or foodstuffs with an identifiable geographical origin." 2081/92, preamble.
36

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. I I

the passage of the regulation by arguing that "a framework of Community rules on
protection will permit the development of geographic indications and designations of
origin since, by providing a more uniform approach, such a framework will ensure
fair competition between the producers of products bearing such indications and
[enhance] the credibility of the products in the consumer's eye. 43
Following the precedent set by national regulations, 2081/92 protects two
different levels of geographic indications: protected designations of origin ("PDOs")
and protected geographic indications ("PGIs"). 44 Both PDOs and PGIs refer to "the
name of a region, a specific place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to
describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff... originating in that region, specific
place or country., 45 PDOs, however, are limited to products whose qualities are
"essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its
inherent natural and human factors" and which are produced, processed and prepared
in the defined geographic area.46 PGIs, in contrast, may describe any foodstuffs that
"possess a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to that
geographical origin" and that are either produced, processed or prepared in the
defined geographic area.47 Despite this differentiation, both PDOs and PGIs are
afforded the same level of protection under 2081/92.48
2081/92 sets out a procedure under which products that are registered as

geographic indications at the Community level enjoy protection in every Member
State. 49 As of July 25, 1993, an association of producers or processors of a
geographically-significant foodstuff may apply for registration.5 In certain
circumstances, a natural or legal person may also be an applicant. 5' As part of the
application, the applicant must draft a product specification, which outlines the
requirements with which foodstuffs must comply to be eligible to use a geographic
indication.52 This application will then be sent to the Member State in which the
geographical area is located and the Member State will be responsible for verifying
that the application is justified and forwarding it to the Commission. 53 Upon

43 Id.
44 Id. at Art. 2(2).
45 Id. at Art. 2(2)(a) and Art. 2(2)(b).
46 Id. at Art. 2(2)(a).
41 Id. at Art. 2(2)(b).
48 The rest of 2081/92 does not differentiate between the protection of PDOs and PGIs. Instead, the

distinction between these two categories must be made by the producer or group of producers initially
registering the geographic indication. See 1107/96 (with parenthetical references to each geographic
indication's designation as a PDO or a PGI).
49 See 2081/92. preamble.
-' Id. at Art. 5(l).
51 Id.

12 Id. at Art. 4(1). The product specification must include at least the following nine requirements:
1) the name of the agricultural product or foodstuff, including the geographic indication; 2) the description
of the agricultural product or foodstuff: 3) the definition of the geographical area; 4) evidence that the
agricultural product or foodstuff originates in the geographical area; 5) a description of the method of
obtaining the agricultural product or foodstuff; 6) the details bearing out the link with the geographical
environment or the geographical origin, depending on the product's designation as a PDO or PGI; 7)
details of the inspection structures to be provided; 8) the specific labeling details; and 9) any requirements
laid down by Community and/or national provisions. 2081/92, An. 4(2).
" Id. at Arts. 4-5. If the name refers to a geographical area located in more than one Member States,
all interested Member States will be consulted before forwarding the application on to the Commission.
See Id. at Art. 5(5).
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receiving the application, the Commission is given six months to verify the
application, after which the Commission will enter the product's name 54in a register
of protected designations of origin and protected geographic indications.
During this process, and for six months following the publication of the
protected name, Member States and natural or legal persons who can demonstrate a
legitimate economic interest are permitted to object to the registration. 55 Objection is
permitted on three grounds: that the name does not meet the definition of either a
PDO or a PGI, that the name would jeopardize an existing trademark or that the
name is generic. 56 As the regulation explicitly warns, "names that have become
generic may not be registered. 57 Genericization is defined as becoming "the
common name of an agricultural product or foodstuff," regardless of whether the
name relates to the place or region where the product of foodstuff was originally
produced or marketed.58
Once a name is registered as a geographic indication, the consequences of such
registration are quite far-reaching. Throughout Europe, geographic indications may
only appear on agricultural products and foodstuffs that comply with 2081/92." 9 In
order to ensure compliance and determine whether foodstuffs bearing a protected
name meet the specific requirements outlined in the product specification, Member
States are required to have inspection structures, 6° the cost of which is borne by the
producers using the protected geographic indication. 6'
Registered names are explicitly protected against the following four
encroachments: 1)any direct or indirect commercial use of a registered name by
similar products not covered by the registration insofar as using the name exploits
the reputation of the protected name; 2) any misuse, imitation or evocation, even if
the true origin is indicated or the protected name is translated or accompanied by an
expression such as "style," "type," etc.; 3) any other false or misleading indication as
to the provenance, origin, nature or essential qualities of the product; and 4) any
other practice liable to mislead the public as to the true origin of the product. 62 A
registered geographic indication also invalidates any future attempt to register that
same name as a trademark.63 Finally, registered names are protected from ever
protects a foodstuff for
becoming generic, meaning that registration under 2081/92
64
perpetuity, regardless of changing consumer perceptions.
2081/92 does not provide any specific remedies to protect against the
infringement of a geographic indication. Instead, since cases involving misuse of a

4 Id. at Arts. 6(1) - 6(3).
" Id. at Arts. 7(l)-7(3).
56 Id. at Art.

7(4).
17 Id. at Art. 3(l).
58 Id.
'9 Id.
" Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.

at Art. 8.
at Art. 10.
at Art. 10(7).
at Art. 13(l).

63 Id. at Art. 14. A pre-existing trademark does not, however, automatically pre-empt the
registration of a name as a geographic indication. See id. at Art. 14(2). Only when such registration is
liable to mislead the consumer "inthe light of a trade mark's reputation and renown and the length of time
it has been used" is such subsequent registration disallowed. ldat Art. 14(3).
64 Id at Art. 13(3).
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registered name are heard by national courts rather than the ECJ,65 the available
relief depends on national legislation.66 National courts have shown themselves in
recent cases to be willing to hear claims for injunctive relief under 2081/92.67
Registration under 2081/92 is not limited to Member States. Countries outside
the European Union may also register for protection of geographic indications as
long as they are able to provide the product specification and inspection regime
required by the regulation and as long as the name of the country of origin is clearly
indicated on the product's label.68
In order to guarantee this protection, national and Community courts alike are
authorized to consider claims under 2081/92,69 and cases in both systems show the
variety of claimants who have standing in such cases. States, private associations,
and private individuals may all bring claims under 2081/92, and private 70parties have
even used interpretations of the regulation as a defense in criminal cases.
Although this regulation went into effect in 1993, the Council did provide
certain Member States with a derogation procedure. Under Article 13(2) of 2081/92,
those Member States that had previously permitted the use of a registered geographic
indication on products that did not meet the specifications laid out under 2081/92
would be granted a five-year extension during which such use would not be deemed
illegal. 7 1 This derogation was limited, however, in that it only applied to Member
States other than the one in which the geographic indication originated and in that,
even during the derogation period, the product's label must clearly indicate its true
origin.72 In March 1996, this derogation was extended for five more years under
Regulation 535/97.73

After the entry into force of 2081/92, Member States were required to provide
the Commission with a list of legally protected names or, for those Member States
74

that did not have a system of protection, a list of names they wished to register.
This list later became Commission Regulation 1107/96, which lists those geographic

65 Cases between two private parties only appear before the ECJ as preliminary references from

national courts. See generally Article 220 (ex Article 165) through Article 245 (ex Article 188) (defining
the Court's jurisdiction). The cases over which the Court has original jurisdiction that refer to geographic
indications are not those concerned with one private party's charge that the other violated a registered
name. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 81-132.
6 See Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft EV v. Warsteiner Brauerei Haus Cramer
GmbH & Co. KG. Case C-312/98, 2000 E.C.R. 1-9187 (referring to Germany's Law on Protection of
Trade Marks and Other Signs, which sets out "the procedure to be followed for the registration of
geographic indications and designations of origin within the meaning of Regulation No. 2081/92, the
arrangements for supervision and monitoring laid down by that regulation. the remedies available and
their limitation period").
67 See Consorzio del Prosciutto de Parna, 2003 E.C.R. 00 at para. 25.
68 See 2081/92. Art. 12.
69 This authorization depends on courts' jurisdiction. The ECJ. for example, hears cases brought
against the Commission, while national court hear cases between private parties. See supra note 65.
70 See Kingdom of Denmark, Federal Republic o"Germany and French Republic v. Commission.
1999 E.C.R. 1-01541 (Member States suing the Commission); Case C-108/01 (Italian producers suing to
protect their own protected geographic indication); Criminal proceedings against Dante Bigi, Case C66/00. 2002 E.C.R. 1-5917 (private criminal defendant using conflict between Article 28 and 2081/92 as a
defense).
71 See 2081/92, Art. 13(2).
72 See id.at, Art. 13(2). See also Bigi, 2002 E.C.R. 1-5917, at ruling.
73See Kingdom of Denmark, Federal Republic of Gernany and French Reptublic v.Connission,
1999 E.C.R. 1-01541 at para. 18.
71 See 2081/92. Art. 17(1).
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indications that the Commission determined fulfilled the requirements of 2081/92.
Each product is designated as either a PDO or a PGI and categorized according to its
primary ingredients. 75 1107/96 also lists names for which Member States
76 did not
seek protection, such as Camembert, Emmental, Brie, Gouda and Cheddar.
The creation of a supranational system of registration for geographic indications
had far-ranging consequences for protection of geographically significant names
within the European Union. First, this form of protection for geographic indications
is much less restrictive than the granting of a trademark. Whereas the latter can be
used only by its owner, 2081/92 confers a collective monopoly on all producers who
meet the product specifications of a particular geographic indication.77 Second,
2081/92 effectively harmonizes the many disparate systems of regulations that had
previously existed throughout Europe. It is no longer necessary that individual
countries sign agreements to recognize one another's protections. Instead, a name
that was previously protected in one Member State is now protected throughout the
European Union. While offering greater protection to producers from the protected
geographic area, this also means that producers from other Member States that were
not previously subject to a protection are now barred from using a label that may
have conferred significant commercial advantage.
Finally, 2081/92 had the effect of eliminating Member State protection regimes
that were not compatible with 2081/92. While Member States are permitted to grant
transitional national protection to a geographic indication that has been proposed to
the Commission for registration under 2081/92, this protection ends on the date the
Commission makes its decision on registration. 78 Even during the transition period,
such national protections must only affect trade within the Member State and cannot
impair intra-Community trade. 79 2081/92 thus either subsumed national regimes,
such as the French AOC system, by registering their protected products, or
invalidated those that could not be incorporated into the supranational system.
2081/92 is not, however, the only system of protection in force in the EU. Many
Member States, while not permitted to have their own separate regimes for
protecting specific geographic indications, have still retained criminal laws
forbidding fraudulent or misleading labeling. These laws, combined with the fact
that the ECJ does not have original jurisdiction over cases between private parties,
mean that national courts are often responsible for deciding cases on the misuse of

75 See 1107/96 (categorizing products as fresh meat (and offal): meat-based products; cheeses; other
products of animal origin (eggs, honey. milk products excluding butter. etc.); oils and fats; olive oils;
fruits, vegetables and cereals; ciders; beer; natural mineral waters and spring waters; bread, pastry, cakes,
confectionery, biscuits and other baker's wares; essential oils).
76 See 1107/96. Note that. while Camembert is not a protected term, France did register Camembert
de Normandie as a protected designation of origin. See id.
77 See Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Canadane Cheese Trading AMBA
and Adelfi G. Kouri Anonymos Emoriki Kai Viomichaniki Etaireia v. Hellenic Republic, Case C-317/95,
1997 E.C.R. 1-4681, para. 36.
71 See Commission v. French Republic, Case C-6/02, 2003 E.C.R. 1-2389, para. 6. Note that the
derogation discussed above tolls from the date of the decision. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
79 See id. at para. 6. In a judgment handed down in 2000, the Court did let stand national protection
of geographic labels for products where there was no link between the product's characteristics and its
geographical provenance. Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft EV, 2000 E.C.R. 1-9187. Such
designations, however, are not geographic indications by definition. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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geographic indications." Furthermore, the transitional national measures discussed
above, along with the derogation procedure Iaid out in the regulation itsell, led to the
existence of parallel national regulations for several years after 2081/92 went into
effect.

C. Case Laiw Under Regulation 2081/92
The passage of 2081/92 has therefore not necessarily limited the cases before
Europe's national courts that address the protection of geographic indications. It has,
however, created a whole new category of cases: those that reach the European
Court of Justice, either by originating before the Court or by being referred by
national courts under Article 234 (ex 177) of the Treaty of Rome. 8' While 2081/92
has so far led to only a limited number of ECJ rulings, representative cases can be
divided into three fairly distinct groups: those that focus on the validity of 2081/92 in
relation to the fundamental principles of the European Union, those that focus on the
validity of national regulations after the passage of 2081/92, and those that challenge
geographic indications within the framework of 2081/92. This Note will consider
these three categories of cases separately.
1.Challenges to the European protection of geographic indications
One of the fundamental principles of the European Union is the free movement
of goods. As laid out in Article 28 (ex 30) of the Treaty of Rome, this principle
means that "[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measure having equivalent
effect shall be prohibited between Member States."82 Article 29 (ex 34) imposes the
same prohibition on restrictions on exports. 83 After the formation of the European
Communities in 1957, the ECJ became increasingly skeptical of any restrictions that
could hinder the free movement of goods and prevent the creation of a true common
market, free of internal trade barriers. In its 1974 judgment in Procureur du Roi v.
Dassonville,8 4 the Court stated that "all trading rules enacted by Member States
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intraCommunity trade are to be considered as measures having equivalent effect to
quantitative restrictions. 85 This definition was then clarified in 1979, in the Court's
landmark ruling in Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesinonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein
("Cassis de Dijon"),8 6 in which the Court stated that restrictions on intra-Community
trade resulting from disparate national marketing laws are only permissible when
"those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating in particular to.. .the fairness of commercial

"' See Bigi. 2002 E.C.R. 1-5917 (Italian criminal case): Criminal proceedings against Yvon Chiciak
and Fromagerie Chiciak. Case C-129/97. 1998 E.C.R. 1-3315 (cited in Mosca. supra note 35. at 580)
(French criminal case).
81Article 234 grants the ECJ jurisdiction over certain preliminary references from national courts.
See TEC Art. 234.
12 TEC Art. 28.

8 TEC Art. 29.
8 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, Case 8174. 1974 E.C.R. 837.
5 Colomner Opinion. 1997 E.C.R. 1-4681 at para. 48.

86 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, C-120/78, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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transactions and the defence of the consumer." 87 As explained by Advocate General
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Cassis de Dijon and its successors mean that "measures of
equivalent effect prohibited by Article [28 are only permissible if ] justified by a
public-interest objective that takes precedence over the free movement of goods.""
Such permissible objectives are outlined in Article 30 (ex 36) of the Treaty of
Rome, which permits restrictions that would otherwise be prohibited by Articles 28
and 29 if they are justified "on grounds of public morality, public policy or public
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection
of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the
protection of industrial and commercial property." 89 Courts must thus apply a twostep inquiry to determine the permissibility of an apparent restriction on the free
movement of goods. First, they must determine whether it is prohibited by either
Article 28 or 29 as interpreted by the ECJ. If so, the regulation may still be valid if it
is found to fall under the Article 30 (ex 36) derogation.
Given the significance of the principle of the free movement of goods to the
establishment of the EU, it comes as little surprise that many of the cases addressing
2081/92 deal with the question of whether the protection of geographic indications
constitutes a measure of equivalent effect prohibited by Articles 28 and 29. Most of
these are references for preliminary rulings, suggesting that national courts are in a
state of confusion regarding the permissible tradeoff between the value of protecting
consumers and producers and that of prohibiting any intra-Community trade barriers.
The case that established the background for many of these cases was decided
just as 2081/92 was being considered. Although it refers only to national protection
of geographic indications, it still provides a valuable introduction to the ECJ's case
law on geographic indications both because it refers to a bilateral convention,
thereby raising similar issues to those that now arise in the context of 2081/92, and
because it approaches these issues similarly to later cases. Exportur SA v. LOR SA
and Confiserie du Tech SA came to the ECJ as a reference for a preliminary ruling
from the Cour d'appel de Montepellier in France. 90 In 1973, France and Spain had
signed a bilateral convention under which both countries agreed to recognize and
protect the geographic indications of the other country in accordance with the latter's
laws. LOR and Confiserie du Tech were two French confectioners who produced
nougat that they labeled as "touron Alicante" and "touron Jijona." "Alicante" and
"Jijona" are the names of Spanish towns known for their nougat and Exportur, a
Spanish producer, brought suit against the defendants for violating the 1973
convention. In deciding this case, the French court referred two questions to the ECJ:
whether Articles 28 and 29 prohibit the measures for the protection of geographic
indications laid out in the 1973 Franco-Spanish Convention, and, if so, whether
Article 30 authorizes
the protection of these geographic indications despite such a
9
prohibition. 1
In its ruling in Exportur, the Court found that, while the protection of
geographic indications provided for in the 1973 convention did constitute a
87 Mosca, supra note 35, at 568 (quoting id.).
88 Colomer Opinion, 1997 E.C.R. 1-468 at para. 48 (referring to Criminal proceedings against
Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard. Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91. 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097).
8) TEC Art. 30.
')

Exportur, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5529.

91 See id. at para. 6.
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prohibited measure under Articles 28 and 29, Article 30 justified this protection so
long as such names had not become generic in the country of origin. 92 The Court did
not, however, specify exactly what aspects of either Article 30 or the Spanish
protections warranted this finding, thereby laying the groundwork for further
questions about the interaction between Articles 28, 29 and 30 in the context of
geographic indications.
In 1995, this question was raised when the Greek Council of State referred a
request for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. In Canadane Cheese Trading AMBA and
Adelfi G. Kouri Anonymos Emoriki Kai Viomichaniki Etaireia v. Hellenic
Republic, 93 Danish and German producers sought the annulment of Greek
regulations regarding the designation of "feta" as a geographic indication. Although
this case concerned a national regulation and did not refer specifically to 2081/92, it
provided the Court with an opportunity to clarify its Exportur ruling. Due to the fact
that the Council of State withdrew the preliminary reference in 1997, the Court never
issued a ruling on the case.94 It did, however, publish the opinion of one of its
Advocates General that95 provides significant guidance as to the Court's approach to
geographic indications.
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer found that, while restrictions on a label
such as "feta" do have equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction under Article 28,
they are still justified under the Article 30 derogation for protection of industrial and
commercial property. 96 This reasoning, if followed by the Court, would mean that
the protection of geographic indications, although having effects equivalent to a
trade barrier, is justified by the EU's countervailing desire to protect the commercial
property of producers of geographically-significant foodstuffs.
The most recent case addressing the interplay between geographic indications
and Articles 28, 29 and 30 was a preliminary ruling from the United Kingdom's
House of Lords. Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma and Salumificio S. Rita SpA v.
Asda Stores Ltd. and Hygrade Foods Ltd. involved a suit brought by Italian
producers to protect their registered geographic indication against distributors within
the United Kingdom. 97 Italy registered "Prosciutto di Parma" under 1107/96 and
restricted this designation to "ham marked with a distinguishing mark allowing it to
be identified at any time, obtained from fresh legs of pigs raised and slaughtered in
mainland Italy, produced in accordance with provisions laid down in the law, and
aged in the typical production area for a minimum period laid down in the law." 98
92 See id. at ruling.

93Canadane Cheese Trading AMBA and Adelfi G. Kouri Anonymos Emoriki Kai Viomichaniki
Etaireia v. Hellenic Republic. Case C-317/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-468 1.
4 See id.. Order of 8 August 1997.
u Although not justices themselves, the Advocates General of the ECJ are often seen as expressing
the views of the Court in cases that do not receive a decision. They have been described as "a high-level
group of friends of the court independent of the Commission and of the litigants. Typically, the Advocates
General have provided more thorough scholarship and more closely reasoned analysis than are evident in
the decisions of the Court of Justice." Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional
Reform in the New GATT, 88 Am. J. I.L. 477, 485 (1994). The Court does not. however, always agree
with the Advocates General, who are charged with making a presentation to the Court after the litigants'
pleadings. and their opinions can sometimes play a role closer to that of a dissenting opinion than a
restatement of the Court's approach.
"6 See Coloiter Opinion. 1997 E.C.R. 1-4681 at para. 79.
97 Consorzio del Prosciutito de Parmia, 2003 E.C.R. 00.
98 Id. at para. 3.
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Defendant distributors purchased ham that fulfilled these requirements, but then
sliced and packaged the ham themselves and sold this as "Prosciutto di Parma."
Plaintiff producers sued for violation of 2081/92, arguing that the product
specification for this geographic indication required that the slicing and packaging of
hams take place in the region of production in order for the designation to be used. 99
The House of Lords referred several questions to the ECJ, including whether such a
slicing and packaging requirement constituted a measure having equivalent effect
under Article 29 and, if so, whether such a measure would nonetheless be
justified. 00
The Court, following the reasoning of the Advocate General in Canadane, found
that, although such requirements did constitute measures having equivalent effect
under Article 29, such protections of geographic indications were justified under
Article 30 in that they protected regional producers.'"' The Court did not, however,
find that this warranted an injunction against the UK producers because the principle
of legal certainty required that the slicing and packaging requirements0 2 be better
publicized in order to create a right of action against economic operators.
In finding the violation of Article 29 justified under Article 30, the Court in
Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma effectively prioritized the property rights of a
small number of producers over the competition and trade protection concerns
embodied in the free movement of goods. Under the Italian law on which the
registration of Prosciutto di Parma as a geographic indication was based, ham could
only benefit from this designation if it was produced in one particular area in the
province of Parma, if it met specific requirements for weight, color, aroma, and
10 3
flavor, and if it had been sliced and packaged in this same area of production.
While the effect of such limitations was to restrict intra-Community trade and grant a
collective monopoly to the relatively small number of producers able to meet these
specifications, the Court permitted such consequences by finding the protection of
commercial property to outweigh its competition and trade concerns. Taken together,
Exportur, Canadane and Consorzio del Prosciutto di Panna show that the Court has
been quite willing to uphold protections of geographic indications, both under
national regulations and under 2081/92. European enforcement thus means that
certain small groups of producers of geographically-significant foodstuffs are
permitted to shield themselves from competition despite the Community principle of
the free movement of goods.
2. Challenges to national protection of geographic indications
One recent case decided by the ECJ falls in a category unto itself in that it
addresses not the validity of registration under 2081/92, but that of registrationn
alongside 2081/92. In Commission v. French Republic ("Salaisons d'Auvergne"),'1
the Court addressed the interaction between national protections and 2081/92,
thereby raising fundamental issues of federal and state power in the regulation and
99 Id. at paras. 2-35.
'"' Id. at paras. 36-37.

...
Id. at para. 81.
"_ See id. at paras. 95-96.
'o See id. at paras. 4-5.
'

Commission v. French Republic, 2003 E.C.R. 1-2389.
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enforcement of geographic indications. In this case, the Commission initiated an
Article 226 (ex 169) enforcement proceeding, charging that France's 1994 law
granting national legal protection to the name "salaisons d'Auvergne, ' ' n0 5 as well as
to regional labels such as "Savoie" and "Franche-Comtd" without registering them
under 2081/92 violated France's obligations under Article 28.106 The Court found for
the Commission, writing that such national protections are only permitted as
transitional measures while the Commission decides on a 2081/92 application and
that France had failed to file such an application within a timely period.,u7 In fact, no
such application was likely to be filed due to the Commission's belief that the terms
were too broad to be granted protection under 2081/92.' ° '
This ruling means that national regulations that, unlike France's continuing
AOC system, have not been subsumed into the EU regime via registration under
2081/92 are no longer valid. As the Court paraphrased the Commission's argument
in Salaisons d'Auv'ergne, "since the entry into force of Regulation No
2081/92,... protection for designations of origin and geographic indications may
now.. .be afforded only within the framework laid down by that regulation.... 9 With
this judgment, the ECJ clearly highlighted the federal nature of the EU's protection
of geographic indications of foodstuffs. Whereas it is unlikely that a national
regulation such as that addressed in Salaisons d'Autergne would have even been
considered by the ECJ prior to 1992, the existence of the European-wide registration
system under 2081/92 effectively eliminated the authority of Member States to pass
such regulations to protect their own geographically-significant foodstuffs.
3. Challenges to particular registrations
The ECI's consideration of geographic indications has not been limited to cases
questioning the overall validity of the principle of protecting these names. A separate
group of cases has arisen that focus on the validity of specific registrations under
2081/92. In these cases, most notably Criminal proceedings against Dante Bigi" °
and Kingdom of Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany and French Republic v.
Commission ("Feta"),"'1 the parties do not question the validity of protecting
geographic indications in general. Instead, they assert that the registration of the
geographic indication in question violated the requirements of 2081/92 in that the
registered name was generic.
Article 3 of 2081/92 disallows the registration of names that have become
generic prior to registration.' 2 In order to determine whether a name has become the
"common name of an agricultural product or a foodstuff," the Commission must take
"'-5
"Salaisons d'Auvergne" refers to a group of seasonings used for curing meats and fish, produced
in the Auvergne region of France.
" Commission v. French Republic, 2003 E.C.R. 1-2389 at paras. 1, 3.
117 Id. at ruling and para. 20.
8Id. at para. 10 ("the Commission doubts whether [Salaisons d'Auvergnel can be registered since
the regulation allows the registration of a particular product or foodstuff but not a category of products
such as those covered by the term "salaisons").
"9 Id. at para. 13.
"'Bigi. 2002 E.C.R. 1-5917.
...
Kingdom of Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany and French Republic v. Commission,.

E.C.R. 1-01541.

112 2081/92, Art. 3(l).
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account of all factors, including: "the existing situation in the Member State in which
the name originates and in areas of consumption, the existing situation in other
Member States, [and] the relevant national or Community laws."'' 3 In order to
illustrate its definition of genericness, the Commission required Member States to
produce an indicative list of product names that, while otherwise qualifying as
geographic indications, were deemed generic. 1 4 This non-exhaustive list was not,
however, sufficient to prevent the ECJ from being presented with cases involving
questions of genericness.
In Feta, the three plaintiff Member States brought suit against the Commission,
arguing that the latter incorrectly permitted Greece to register "feta" as a geographic
indication. " 5 In 1994, the Hellenic Republic sought registration of the term "feta" as
a PDO under 2081/92, providing the specification that feta is a "salted white cheese
traditionally produced in Greece.. .from sheep's milk or a mixture of sheep's milk
and goats' milk." '" 6 The specifications went on to require that the milk used to
produce feta "must come exclusively from the regions of Macedonia, Thrace, Epirus,
Thessaly, Central Greece, Peloponnese and Lesbos," that this milk must meet certain
conditions and that the cheese itself must meet certain organoleptic and taste
characteristics.'' 7 In order to verify that this geographic indication was not generic,
the Commission conducted an opinion poll of 12,800 nationals of EU Member
States, known as a Eurobarometer survey. 118 The Commission also consulted the
Scientific Committee for Designations of Origin, Geographic indications and
Certificates of Specific Character, which based its findings on the Eurobarometer
survey. 19 In 1996, after the completion of these various procedures, "feta" was
included as a protected name under 1107/96.120
Denmark, Germany and France responded to this registration by arguing both
that "feta" did not fit the definition of a geographic indication set out in 2081/92 and
that it had become generic prior to the application for registration.' 21 The Court
concurred, ruling that 1107/96 must be annulled to the extent that it registered "feta"
as a PDO.1 22 The Court found that the Commission erred in determining genericness
based only on the Eurobarometer survey and the findings of the Scientific
23
Committee, both of which were founded entirely on consumer perceptions.,
Instead, genericness must be determined according to the procedure set out in

"' Id.at Art. 3(1).
114See supra note 76.
5

The three governments alleged infringement of 2081/92, Articles 2(3), 3(l), and 17(2). Kingdomn
of Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany and French Republic v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 1-01541 at
"1

para. 48.
116Id. at para. 31.
17Id. at para. 32-34.

'" See id. at para. 36-37. These citizens were asked whether they had seen or heard the name "feta,"
with what they associate this name, whether the name evokes a country or region, and whether they
consider it a common name. Id. at para. 37.
"' See id. at paras. 39-41, 64.
2)See 1107/96.
12' See Kingdomn of Deinark, Federal Republic of Germany and French Republic v. Commission,

1999 E.C.R. 1-01541 at paras. 49-50.
'22
Id. at ruling.
123
Id. at paras. 85-88.
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2081/92, namely by taking into account all
factors rather than just consumer
24
perceptions throughout the European Union.
This question of genericness was again raised in Bigi, a case the Court decided
in 2002. In this criminal proceeding before Italy's Tribunale di Parma, Dante Bigi
was accused of violating Italian laws on fraudulent trading, on the marketing of
products bearing misleading marks or signs, and on the use of PDOs. 25 Bigi
produced a grated cheese that did not comply with the specifications for use of the
term "Parmigiano Reggiano." He sold this cheese exclusively outside Italy and
labeled it as "parmesan."' 126 The Consorzio del Formaggio Parmigiano Reggiano
issued a complaint, which led to the seizure of this "parmesan" intended for export,
and criminal charges were levied against Bigi. 1 7 Bigi countered that his actions fell
under the derogation regime of Article 13(2) of 2081/92 since his product was
was therefore not
intended only for export to other Member States, and that he
28
required to meet the specifications for use of a protected name.
During its deliberations, the Tribunale di Parma referred this case to the ECJ for
a preliminary ruling and it was as part of this referral that the question of genericness
arose. In response to the questions posed by the Tribunale di Parma, the German
government intervened to assert that the entire referral was inadmissible because the
term "parmesan" had become a generic name and consequently was not a valid
geographic indication.'29 The Court, however, rejected this argument, finding instead
that "it is far from clear that the designation 'parmesan' has become generic."'' 30 The
Court then went on to address the Italian court's questions regarding 2081/92's
derogation regime, finding that this system of derogations does not apply to products
originating in the Member State of the protected name.' 3' Bigi was not, therefore,
permitted to use the derogation provisions of 2081/92 as a defense since the
geographic indication
he allegedly misused originated in the Member State in which
32
he was producing.'
4. Similarities between cases
All of these cases before the ECJ, whether they address the validity
of the
registration regime, the validity of national regimes, the generic nature of a particular
name or the applicability of the derogation regime, share certain similarities. Most
are notable for the level of state involvement, and most share similar rhetoric,
regardless of the facts or issues involved.
a. Public involvement

124Id. at para. 88. See also supra text accompanying note 64.
125Bigi. 2002 E.C.R. 1-5917 at para. 2.
126Id. at para. 10.

127Id. at paras. 11-12.
"28

29

Id. at para. 13.

Id. at para. 15.
""Id. at para. 20 (referring to other governments' contention that "parmesan" is the correct French
translation of "Parmigiano Reggiano," which is a valid PDO).
'-' Id. at ruling.
132
Id.
'

2005]

CURED MEAT AND IDAHO POTATOES

Of the cases described above, all had Member State involvement to a varying
degree. Although Canadane had no Member States submitting observations, the
Greek government was involved as a defendant. 133 In Feta, the plaintiffs were
Member State governments, while the defendant was the Commission, itself a public
body. Salaisons d'Auvergne represented the reverse, with the Commission bringing
charges against a Member State. In Consorzio, ostensibly a case between private
producers, four Member State governments and the Commission all submitted
observations, with the Commission and the Spanish, French and Italian governments
arguing on behalf of the plaintiffs and the United Kingdom government defending
the British producers.' 34 Public parties also submitted observations in Exportur and
Bigi, with the Commission taking part in both and the German, Spanish and United
Kingdom governments playing a role in the first and the Italian, German,
Greek,
135
French, Austrian and Portuguese governments taking part in the second.
This level of state involvement is noteworthy for two reasons. On the one hand,
it highlights the ECJ's independence. Although the Court will cite Member States'
arguments and refer to their observations, the mere fact of Member State
involvement is not enough to determine the outcome of a case. While the Court did,
for example, use the fact that the majority of Member States believed "parmesan"
not to be a generic term as a reason to reject the German government's claim to that
effect in Bigi, 136 the involvement of multiple Member States did not appear to have
such a clear effect on the Exportur decision. Nor is the argument of another EU
institution sufficient to convince the ECJ,
as shown by its willingness to reject the
137
Commission's arguments in Exportur.
On the other hand, this Member State involvement also highlights the
continuing protection of national interests in the European Union. In those cases in
which Member States submitted observations, many clearly did so in order to protect
their own nationals. In Consorzio it is unlikely that the United Kingdom's
involvement was unrelated to the fact that the defendants in the case were United
Kingdom distributors who, prior to the supranational registration system of 2081/92,
would not have been subject to Italy's national requirements for the use of the term
"Prosciutto di Parma." In Exportur, Spain's involvement was likely connected to the
fact that a finding in favor of the French defendants would severely harm Spanish
nougat producers who had heretofore been shielded from competition under the
Franco-Spanish convention. In their observations in Bigi, it is also likely that the
German and Austrian governments believed that their national cheese producers
could benefit were "parmesan" found to be generic, and thus not limited to use by
producers in a small region in Italy. 138 Finally, the countries that are actually parties
in cases involving geographic indications are undoubtedly taking part in litigation to
protect their national producers. The involvement of Denmark, France and Germany
in Feta was directly linked to the fact that cheese producers in all three countries had

133
It is also possible that observations would have been submitted later had the Council of State not
withdrawn its preliminary reference.

134See Consorzio del Prosciuto de Panna, 2003 E.C.R. 00 at para. 60-61.

135See Exportur. 1992 E.C.R. 1-5529; Bigi, 2002 E.C.R. 1-5917.
136See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
'37See Exportur. 1992 E.C.R. 1-5529 at para. 28 ("The Commission's position...cannot be
accepted").
1' Bigi, 2002 E.C.R. 1-5917, at para. 20.
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produced feta prior to the passage of 1107/96,139 and Greece's involvement in
Canadane was due entirely to its attempt to protect its own cheese producers. Thus,
while certain Member States may view themselves as neutral observers in cases
regarding geographic indications, the majority of their observations are directly tied
to assertions of the interests of their own national producers, either against other
Member State nationals or against encroaching EU or national regulations.
b. Consumer-producer rhetoric
A further similarity between these cases, apart from the involvement of Member
States and EU institutions, is the rhetoric used by the Court. Throughout these cases,
the ECJ chooses to couch its approach to geographic indications in terms of the
protection of both consumers and producers, not clearly favoring either side. As
early as Evporttur, the Court referred to names that "enjoy a high reputation amongst
' 40
consumers and constitute for producers...an essential means of attracting custom."
This rhetoric of dual interests was then picked up by the Council when drafting
2081/92. Throughout the preamble to the regulation, reference is made to both
consumers and producers. The diversification of agricultural production is to be
encouraged both to "improve[e] the incomes of farmers" and to assist consumers
who are "tending to attach greater importance to the quality of foodstuffs."1 4 1 A
Community-wide approach is particularly encouraged in order to "ensure fair
competition between the producers of products bearing such indications and enhance
the credibility of the products in the consumers' eyes." 14 2 In short, "entry in a
register should...provide information to those involved in trade and to
consumers."'' 43 Geographic indications, therefore, are justified on the grounds of
both consumer protection and producer protection: consumers are assured of the
quality of a reputable product, while producers are shielded from unfair competition
making use of their product's name. Following the rhetoric of 208 1/92, neither of
these principles is prioritized; rather, they complement one another in upholding the
protection of geographic indications throughout Europe.
After the passage of 2081/92, the ECJ adhered to this rhetoric favoring both
consumers and producers, but did so through one particular conception: "quality." In
Consorzio del Proscititto di Parma, for example, the Court referred on multiple
occasions to the quality guarantee inherent in protected names,144 and justified its
finding by pointing to 2081/92 and its intention "to meet consumers' expectations as
regards products of quality and an identifiable geographical origin and to enable
producers, in conditions of fair competition, to secure higher incomes in return for a
genuine effort to improve quality."' 145 The opinion of the Advocate General in
Canadane echoed this focus on quality, referring to a product's "good
3 See, e.g., Kingdom of Denmark Federal Republic of Germany and French Republic v.
Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 1-01541 at para. 63.
14"Exportur, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5529 at para. 28. The Court continued, "They are therefore entitled to
protection." Id.
'412081/92. preamble.
142

Id.

143Id.
144 See, e.g., Cotsorzio del Proscittto de Parma. 2003 E.C.R. 00 at para. 48 (referring to the
"criterion of quality to which...consumers have in recent years tended to attach greater importance").
145 Id. at para. 63.
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reputation.. .amongst consumers because the geographical name guarantees...the
prescribed quality of the product" and supporting the legal protection of
geographical names based on the principles of "safeguard[ing] producers' interests
against unfair competition
and protect[ing] consumers against information which
146
may mislead them."'
This balance between a consumer focus and a producer focus was reinforced in
Feta, where the Court criticized the Commission for its myopic focus on the
consumer. Whereas the Commission effectively based its findings on the
Eurobarometer opinion poll, the Court argued that the genericness of a name must be
determined by the totality of relevant factors, not just the perception of European
consumers.147 The ECJ, therefore, adheres even more strongly to the two-part focus
of 2081/92 than did the Commission in its application of the regulation. Geographic
indications are not, in the view of the Court, to be protected just in order to protect
consumers from false or misleading information about low-quality products. Instead,
geographic indications exist in Europe both for such consumer protection and for the
protection of producers against tarnishment of their product and unfair competition.
III. AMERICAN PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS
Federal protection of geographic indications in the United States emerged
approximately five decades prior to the passage of Regulation 2081/92 in the
European Union. Before 1946, such protection was limited to general provisions on
mislabeling and general legal doctrines used by some courts on behalf of the
producers of geographically-significant foodstuffs. In 1946, however, Congress
passed the Lanham Act, within which it created certification marks. Although not
limited to geographic indications, certification marks proved to be the way that most
geographically-significant foodstuffs were, and still are, protected through court
enforcement. This Part will first present the historical protection of geographic
indications before outlining the provisions of the Lanham Act with regard to
certification marks and then discussing representative American court cases
addressing geographic indications. It will conclude with a comparison of the selected
American cases.
A. Historical Background

Prior to 1946, federal protection of geographical names for foodstuffs was
limited to general laws that forbade the labeling of products with misleading names,
regardless of whether these names were geographically-significant. Even these laws
were oftentimes not applicable to Roquefort, Idaho potatoes or other such foodstuffs:
the 1935 Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA), while establishing a strict
ban on "statements [on the label] that are... false [or] misleading," applied only to
wine labels.' 48 Nor could producers use the common law of intellectual property to

146Coloiner Opinion, 1997 E.C.R. 1-4681 at para. 35.
147See Kingdom of Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany and French Republic v. Conmission,

1999 E.C.R. 1-01541 at paras. 73, 88.
'48 Chen, supra note 18, at 42-43 (brackets in the original).
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protect geographic indications. Until 1946, fear of monopolies meant
that
49
geographical names were prohibited form being registered as trademarks. 1
Furthermore, states did very little to protect geographic indications within their
borders. Most state regulation of such labels arose after

19 4 6 ;' i

°

earlier protections,

such as the creation of an Idaho Potato Commission in 1939, were few and far
between. 151 These were also territorially limited and applied only within the state in
which they were passed.
This lack of protection directed specifically at geographic indications did not
mean that such names were never protected in the United States. Any protection that
did occur, however, depended entirely on judicial discretion. In the 1930s, two cases
were brought before the Supreme Court of New York to protect the name
"Roquefort." Both cases found for the parties seeking protection. In Douglas v.
Newark Cheese Co., 152 a French corporation and one of its American sales
representatives brought suit against two American corporations, seeking an
injunction to prevent the defendants from representing their blue cows' milk cheese
as genuine Roquefort. The court, after describing the requirements for a cheese to be
designated as Roquefort,' 53 focused on the packaging of the cheese in this case.
Although the plaintiffs were not permitted to register the geographical name
"Roquefort" as a trademark, they had registered the triangular packaging of
Roquefort in 1932.154 Without confirming that this exclusive trademark was
necessarily valid, the court still found for the plaintiffs, contending that the
defendants "must not indulge in acts which will deceive the public into buying the
substitute as the original Roquefort."' 155 Furthermore, the court found that the name
156
"Roquefort" had acquired a secondary meaning and was thus subject to protection.
Two years later, the same plaintiffs brought a second suit against a new set of
defendants. In Douglas v. Mod-Urn Cheese Packing Co.,' 57the defendants were
distributors of a cheese mixture containing fifty percent cream cheese and fifty
percent genuine Roquefort cheese, which they labeled as "Mod-Urn Roquefort
Spread" and further designated as being "Genuine French Roquefort."'"5 Plaintiffs
brought an action for an injunction, claiming that this use of the term "Roquefort"
was unfair competition. The court found that that "'Roquefort' has acquired a
secondary meaning" such that a "buyer of Roquefort cheese naturally assumes that
he is receiving the cheese made in the Roquefort, France, district, in accordance with
the peculiar process there employed."' 159 In order to prevent the defendants "from

149 See Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich. Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir.
1962)
(quoting a commentator on the Lanham Act as writing, "If the name was to be found in an atlas..., that
was sufficient to preclude registration").
'i See infra text accompanying 196-207.
'51 See ID ST 22-1207 (1939 state statute defining the powers of the Idaho Potato Commission)
ID
ST 22-912 (1941 state statute providing for fine or imprisonment for misuse of the designation "Idaho
potato").
1.2 Douglas v. Newark Cheese Co., 274 N.Y.S. 406 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1934).
153See supra note 24.
1.4 Newark Cheese Co., 274 N.Y.S. at 409.
...
Id. at 413.
116See id.
1.7 Douglas v. Mod-Um Cheese Packing Co., 290 N.Y.S. 368 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1936).
158Mod- Urn Cheese Packing Co., 290 N.Y.S. at 369.
151Id. at 369.

20051

CURED MEAT AND IDAHO POTATOES

enrich[ing] themselves at the plaintiff's expense" and "prevent fraud upon the
public," the court granted the injunction. 160
While Newark Cheese and Mod-Urn both constituted victories for French

producers of Roquefort, these judicial holdings still did not guarantee the protection
of the term "Roquefort," let alone any other geographic indication for which
protection might be desired. Instead, they depended on the discretion of judges.
While the judges in these two cases were willing to find a secondary meaning and
view the misuse of a geographically-significant designation as a threat to consumers
and producers alike, such findings were not assured. With no clear registration
system, producers could not be certain that their foodstuffs would be protected from
unfair competition in the United States before 1946.
B. Lanham Act
On July 5, 1946, this uncertainty changed with the passage of the Trademark
Act of 1946 (hereinafter "Lanham Act"). 16 The trademark rights protected in the
Lanham Act grew out of the common law of unfair competition and were enshrined
by Congress under its commerce power. 162 Most relevant to geographic indications
was a "special creature" in trademark law created with the passage of the Lanham
Act: 163 the certification mark, which identifies both products and services as
complying with a uniform standard or quality established by the certifying individual
or entity. 164
Certification marks are protected under Section 4 of the Lanham Act, which
refers generally to "collective and certification marks" and specifically to
"indications of regional origin."' 165 Certification marks can be used to indicate the
regional or other origin of a product; the material, mode of manufacture, quality,
accuracy or other characteristics of a product; or the organization performing the
work or labor on a product. 166 In order to be registered as a certification mark, a
geographical name need not have a secondary meaning. 167 Examples
of certification
16 9
marks registered in the United States include Roquefort cheese, 168 Idaho potatoes,

I'
Id. at, 369-70.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.
"2_See Sheldon Klein, Introduction to Trademarks, in Understanding basic Trademark Law 99, 125
'6'

(Practising Law Institute, 2003) ("The Constitutional basis for federal trademark protection is the
Commerce Clause, Article 1. Section 8, Clause 8").
163Terry E. Holtzman, Tips from the Trademark Examining Operation, 81 Trademark Rep. 180, 180.
See also Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962) ("the
Lanham Act created an entirely new registered mark which was denominated a 'certification mark"').
164Klein, supra note 162, at 103.
161 15 U.S.C. § 1054.
'66 Holtzman, supra note 163, at 181. These categories are not mutually exclusive. Id.
I67 See Faehndrich. 303 F.2d at 497. If a geographical name does have a secondary
meaning, it can
be registered as a trademark and may not qualify for registration as a certification mark. See Klein, supra
note 162, at 115; Holtzman, supra note 163, at 189 (using the example of "Fontina," which is not
registered as a certification mark, to note that the "primary significance of the term must be geographic. If
the geographic term also describes the type of product certified... the geographic term will be subject to
refusal or disclaimer, as appropriate.").
168See Holtzman, supra note 163. at 181.
169See infra text accompanying notes 225-36.
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Vidalia onions, 170 Colombian coffee 17 1 and citrus products from California and
Florida. 172
73
Certification marks are not registered by producers of the goods they protect .
Instead, the owner of a certification mark is responsible for establishing the
standards that products must meet to use the mark and licensing the mark to

producers who meet these specifications.174 Owners may be individuals, nations,
states, municipalities or associations, 75 but they must meet the following four
requirements: I) they must exercise control over the mark; 2) they must not engage
in the production or marketing of any goods or services under the mark; 3) they must
not allow the mark to be used for purposes other than certification; and 4) they must
not discriminately refuse to certify. 76 This latter requirement means that an owner
must license the mark to a producer if that producer's goods or services meet the
owner's standards. 177 Examples of certification mark owners in the United States
include the Idaho Potato Commission and the Community of Roquefort.' 78

Although federal registration is not necessarily required for protection, it is

generally recommended. 179 And, as shown by cases involving producers of
foodstuffs that were not registered as certification marks, federal registration often
provides the best form of protection for indications of geographical origin.', t
Under Section 4 of the Lanham Act, registered certification marks are generally
entitled to the same protections provided to trademarks.' 8' Certification marks,
however, are unique intellectual property rights in that they do not convey the
exclusive fights of trademarks. 8 2 Since the owner of a certification mark may not
produce goods protected by the mark and may not discriminately refuse to certify the
mark, the rights provided by a certification mark are available to all those producers
whose goods meet the standards set out by the owner of the mark.
A certification mark grants both the owner of the mark and "any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by [infringement]" the right to
bring a federal civil action against infringers.' 83 The Lanham Act thus federalized the
protection of geographic indications by creating a federal cause of action that could
be brought against the misuse of such labels. In the words of one commentator,
registration of a certification mark "confers a nationwide right of priority" over any

17,Holtzman, supra note 163, at 185. Vidalia onions have been described by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals as being "world renown[ed], [having] a sweet taste,... indigenous to the South Georgia
region. and [able to bring] a higher price than most other onions." Scott v. DeMenna. 840 F.2d 8, 9 (11 th
Cir. 1988).
171Holtzman. supra note 163, at 185.
172Id. at 185.

173
See id. at 184 ("a certification mark is used only to certify the goods and services of others").
174
See id. at 183 and 192. Part of the registration process includes identifying the specific qualities
or characteristics associated with a certification mark and providing a copy of the standards. Id. at 192.
"' Id. at 184-85. Umbrella organizations such as trade associations or governmental bodies or
agencies may also be the owners of certification marks. Id. at 184-85.
"' Id. at 186-88. See also 15 USC § 1054.
177
See. e.g., id. at 183.
171See Idaho Potato Commission v. Washington Potato Commission. 410 F.Supp. 171 (D.Idaho
1975); Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich. Inc., 303 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1962).
17' Klein. supra note 162. at 103.
's" See infra text accompanying notes 215-17.
15 U.S.C. § 1054.
See Faehndrich, 303 F.2d at 497.
18315 U.S.C. § 1125.
's'
'82
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other use of the designation that does not meet the specified requirements.' 8 4 This
protection also has international ramifications in that it excludes entry into the
United States by any goods infringing a registered mark. 8 5
The Lanham Act specifically provides remedies for the infringement of any
protected mark, meaning that misuse of a certification mark can lead to both
injunctive relief and monetary damages. 186 Monetary recovery of profit and
damages, however, is limited to situations in which the infringer knew that
infringement of the certification
mark was intended to be used to deceive or cause
87
confusion or mistake.
Since certification marks are subject to both the same benefits and the same
prohibitions as trademarks,' 8 the genericization of a mark can lead to its registration
being cancelled by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). 89 Once a designation
has become "the common descriptive name for the goods or services," it is no longer
an indication of geographic origin and therefore may no longer be protected.' 9 Such
cancellation has not recently occurred, however, because the process requires
funding that Congress has not appropriated for several years.' 91
Alongside the creation of a registration scheme for certification marks, the
Lanham Act provides two other forms of protection for certain geographicallysignificant foodstuffs. The first provision, which applies more narrowly than
certification marks, provides trademark rights to those geographic names that have
developed a secondary meaning. 192 In certain circumstances, the producer of a
foodstuff whose name refers to its geographic origin may be permitted to register for
exclusive rights if this name has come to develop a secondary meaning while also
meeting the general requirements for trademarks, such as not having also become
generic. 93 The second provision applies much more broadly than granting either
trademark or certification mark protection. Under Section 43 of the Lanham Act,
civil actions are permitted when any description is used in a commercial context in
such a way that it either misrepresents the "nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin" of that good or is likely to cause confusion "as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval" of that good. 194 This false advertising provision is
available to all persons who believe themselves "likely to
be damaged by such act,"
95
regardless of the registration of a geographic indication.
184Klein,

supra note 162, at 106.
...
Id. at 113 (noting the requirement that marks be recorded with the U.S. Customs Service).
"'See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Lanham Act, Section 32); 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (Lanham Act, Section 34,
providing that the "several courts vested with jurisdiction arising under this Act shall have power to grant
injunctions.. to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office").
8715 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(b). A question remains, however, as to whether monetary damages are
permitted in the absence of evidence of counterfeiting. See Idaho Potato Commission v. M & M Produce
Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130, 140-41 (2d. Cir. 2003) (questioning the district courts' "per se rule that
absent counterfeiting a licensor of a certification mark may never recover profits from an infringing
licensee," but declining to decide the issue).
'88
See Holtzman, supra note 163, at 189-91.
189
See Klein. supra note 162, at 124-25.
"' Id. at 124.
'9' Id. at 124-25.
192
See supra note 167.
193
For more on the requirements for trademarks, see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.
'9415 U.S.C. § 1125.
'9'15 U.S.C. § 1125.
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While it did establish a federal scheme for the protection of geographic
indications, the Lanham Act did not foreclose the possibility of states also acting to
protect the geographically-significant names of foodstuffs produced within their
borders, as long as such protection does not impede interstate commerce.' 96 Before
1946, Idaho passed legislation limiting the use of the word "Idaho" in connection
with potatoes, but few other states had acted similarly. 97 As trade in foodstuffs has
increased along with consumer willingness to pay more for products whose quality is
believed to be linked to their geographical origin, states have become more involved
in this field, creating a system of laws parallel to the Lanham Act.
Some states, such as California, have a blanket provision limiting the use of
terms similar to "California-grown" in reference to any food or agricultural
products. 9 8 Many other states, however, have much more specific provisions
directed at criminalizing the geographic misrepresentation of specific foodstuffs. In
Florida, which passed the Florida Citrus Code in 1949,199 falsely shipping "foreign20 0
grown fruit or oranges" as Florida-grown is a second-degree misdemeanor.
Georgia's Vidalia Onion Act of 1986 makes it unlawful to sell or label any onions as
Vidalia onions or to use the term "Vidalia" in connection with such onions unless
2
they meet the statute's definition of Vidalia onions and are grown within Georgia. 0
Violation of this statute is a felony that can lead to civil liability, fines of $1000 to
202
$5000 and imprisonment for one to three years. 2 2 And the Hawaiian legislature has
targeted coffee producers who use the label "100% Hawaiian coffee" for any coffee
not from the state.
As part of their regulation of geographic indications, some states also specify
quality requirements that products must meet to be able to use the state's name in
advertising and labeling. In 1981, for example, Minnesota passed legislation limiting
the rice producers who could sell their product as "wild rice grown in Minnesota."
Under its statute, not only must 100% of the rice be grown in Minnesota, but so too
must it meet certain production conditions that vary depending on whether it is
harvested according to traditional methods or cultivated. 2°
Along with the Idaho Potato Commission, which is charged both with the
registration and oversight of Idaho's certification marks and with the general

196See infra note 208 and accompanying text.

197See supra note 150-51 and accompanying text.
"s See CA FOOD & AG § 43100 (defining "a deliberately misleading or unwarranted use of these

items or terms [as] a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) or
more than three thousand dollars ($3,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six
months, or by both the fine and imprisonment"). This law was passed in its original form in 1989. Id.
'99FL ST 60 1.01.
2111
FL ST 865.02. A misdemeanor of the second degree is punishable by up to 60 days in prison. FL
ST 775.082. This law was passed in its original forn in 1971. FL ST 865.02.

251GA ST 2-14-134. Vidalia onions are defined as "varieties of Allium Cepa of the hybrid yellow
granex, granex parentage, or other similar varieties" and the Vidalia onion production area "means a
production area which encompasses only the State of Georgia or such lesser area as may be provided for."

GA ST 2-14-134.
22 GA ST 2-14-134, 2-14-135.
213HI ST § 486-120.6. This law was passed in its original form in 1991. HI ST § 486-120.6.
_..
MINN ST 30.49. Wild rice that is labeled as "natural lake or river wild rice" must be labeled
differently than cultivated rice, the labeling of which also differs according to whether or not it is
considered "paddy" rice. Id. See generally Juliana Gruenwald, It Isn't Rice and It Isn't Always Wild, The
Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 2003, at F01.
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oversight of the potato industry in the state, 20 5 many other state commissions have
been established to monitor the quality and labeling of foodstuffs with geographical
names. Georgia established a Vidalia Onion Advisory Panel, 2° while the Wisconsin
legislature empowered the Department of Agriculture to design a logotype for
"100% Wisconsin Cheese" and then monitor
20 7 that its use conforms with the quality
controls laid out in the state's dairy statutes.
The Lanham Act thus exists alongside these various state efforts to protect
regional producers. The federal protections it offers, however, are much broader in
scope than those offered by the states. First, the effective enforcement of state law is
often territorially limited in practice, if not in theory. Second, state law provisions
vary significantly by state, while the Lanham Act has the benefit of uniformity
regardless of the state to which it is applied. Third, these state laws are limited by the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution in that they cannot impose an
excessive burden on interstate commerce.20 8 Finally, while states have general laws
against false advertising and mislabeling that can apply to foodstuffs from beyond
their borders, the Lanham Act is much less limited in the products it can protect. In
addition to protecting producers throughout the fifty states, the Lanham Act can also
protect international producers selling foodstuffs within the United States;
certification marks are not limited to American registrants.
C. Case Law Under the Lanhan Act
As shown by Newark Cheese Co. and Mod-Urn Cheese Packing Co., state
courts were protecting geographic indications prior to the Lanham Act. 2 0 9 Yet while

both of these cases found Roquefort to be a protected designation, neither provided
clear guidance for future protection, nor was either at the federal level. After 1946,
cases came before the federal courts demanding specific protections under Section 4
of the Lanham Act. Protection of certification marks is not, however, the only theory
under which cases have been brought. Given the variety of approaches that state and
federal law has taken to geographic indications, court enforcement of these
designations has also been quite varied.
1. Cases outside of certification mark protection
In re Montrachet S.A.,2t ° centered on the protection of trademark, rather than
certification marks. In this case, a single French cheese producer appealed the
decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
denying its registration of "Montrachet" as a trademark.21 According to the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, "Montrachet," which had originated as a
2"' See ID 22-1207.
26 GA ST 2-14-138.
207WI

ST 93.07. The Department was empowered to create the Wisconsin logotype in 1975. WI ST

100-57.

28 See, e.g., Bridenbaug v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000) ("the premise of
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence is an inference that the grant of power to Congress in Art. I § 8
cl. 3 implies a limitation on state authority over the same subject").
2_'See supra text accompanying notes 152-60.
2111
878 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
211Id. at 375.
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geographic indication for the petitioner's product, had become a generic term for
goat cheese. 2 12 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
writing that the genericization of a term is to be determined by looking at "how the
mark is understood by the purchasing public." 213 Here, the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board had not met this burden, so the denial of a trademark to the producers
of Montrachet was reversed.214
Whereas the petitioner in Montrachet turned to the more restrictive provisions of
trademark law to protect its geographic indications, the petitioners in the more recent
case of Sugai Products, Inc. v. Kona Kai Farms, Inc. 215 took an entirely different
approach. In this case, petitioners had not registered their product, Hawaiian-based
Kona coffee, as a certification mark, so they brought suit based on the more broadly
applicable false advertising provision of the Lanham Act. 2 16 Over six hundred Kona
coffee growers filed a class action suit against defendants for allegedly rebagging
Central American coffee as Kona coffee. The District Court, however, denied class
certification to these plaintiffs, finding, among other things, that they had not shown
217
the "discernibly competitive injury" required to bring a false advertising claim.
This case thus highlights the difficulty of federally enforcing geographic indications
that are not protected as certification marks. While Montrachet shows the
willingness of federal courts to defend geographic indications when protected by the
strong provisions of trademark law, Sugai Products represents the other side of the
spectrum, where federal courts are not willing to interpret the broadest provisions of
the Lanham Act to protect unregistered geographic indications.
2. Cases enforcing certification marks
Alongside cases such as these, from opposite extremes of the Lanham Act,
federal courts have also considered many cases involving the actual certification
mark provisions of Section 4. In Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich,
2
Inc.,
a French municipality that had registered "Roquefort" as a certification mark
in the United States filed a complaint against a New York cheese importer for
infringement. 2 19 According to the certification mark, registered in 1953, "Roquefort"
could only be used "to indicate that the [product] has been manufactured from
sheep's milk only, and had been cured in the natural caves of the Community of
Roquefort, Department of Aveyron, France, in accordance with the historic methods
and usages of production, curing and development which have been in vogue there

212See

id. at 375-76 ("The issue thus is not whether MONTRACHET is capable of serving as a

trademark or is capable of acquiring trademark significance, [but rather] whether MONTRACHET has
lost its original trademark significance.").
213Id. at 376.
214 Id. at 377.

2"11997 WL 824022 1(D.Haw. 1997).
216Id. at 11. See also supra text accompanying note 194-95. Plaintiffs also brought claims Linder the

Hawaii Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Hawaii Unfair Practices Act. See 1997 WL
824022 at 1.
2" 1997 WL 824022 at II and 17. The Court found that plaintiffs did not meet "the numerosity
requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1), the adequacy requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4), or any of the
alternative requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)." Id. at 17.
2" 303 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1962).
211Id. at 495.
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for a long period of years." 22 The cheese that Faehndrich sold as "Roquefort" had
been produced in Hungary and Italy, 221 and the district court judge found this fact
sufficient to grant summary judgment to the Community of Roquefort and enjoin
Faehndrich from further use of the protected term on products not meeting the
certification mark's requirements. 222 Before the court of appeals, Faehndrich argued
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether "Roquefort" had become
a generic term. 223 The court rejected this argument and affirmed summary judgment,
finding no evidence of consumer perceptions of "Roquefort" as a generic term and
pointing to the fact that "producers of French Roquefort224cheese have diligently
protected the name from unfair competition in this country."
A later case regarding geographic indications centered not on the genericization
of a certification mark, but rather on the party authorized to protect this mark. In
Idaho Potato Commission v. Washington Potato Commission, 225 the Idaho Potato
Commission ("IPC") and the state of Idaho brought a suit against the Washington
226
Potato Commission for infringement of the mark "Idaho" in reference to potatoes.
227
Although this case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction,
the court
established that the IPC, rather than the state of Idaho, had the authority to bring suit
to protect against the infringement of its mark and unfair competition.228
Once granted this authority to bring suit on its own, without state involvement,
the IPC appeared before the Second Circuit in 2003 to again protect its certification
mark against infringement. 22 In 1990, the IPC licensed its certification marks to M
& M Produce Farm & Sales ("M & M"), a New York farm that bought bulk potatoes
from licensed Idaho potato vendors and repackaged them in smaller bags bearing the
IPC's certification marks. 21 In 1995, M & M returned the license, thereby losing the
right to use these marks. Upon learning that M & M was continuing to use bags
bearing the certification marks, the IPC filed a suit in district court. 232 A jury granted
monetary damages to the IPC, but the judge
vacated this award as a matter of law,
only upholding the verdict for IPC. 233 IPC appealed, and the Second Circuit
-

2211
Id. at 496.

221Id.
222Id. at 494.
221Id. at 497 (referring to a genuine issue of fact as to "whether the term 'Roquefort'

has acquired

principal significance as a description of blue-mold sheep's milk [cheese] regardless of its origin and
without reference to the method of curing employed in the limestone caves of Roquefort, France").
224
Id. at 498.
22'410 F.Supp. 171 (D. Idaho 1975).

226Id. at 173. Although the claim in this case refers to trademarks as opposed to certification marks,
the actual mark at issue appears to be a certification mark. This conclusion is drawn both from the type of
protection sought and comparison to Idaho Potato Commission v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, where
the IPC again brought a claim based on "trademark," but the court refers specifically to the IPC's
certification marks. See infra text accompanying notes 229-36.
227
Id. at 183. The court found that its exercise of jurisdiction over individual member of the
Washington Potato Commission, many of whom were never physically present in Idaho, would be against
the principles of "fair play" and "substantial justice." Id. at 182-83.
228
Id. at 175 (concluding that "the State of Idaho is a nominal party and the I.P.C. is the real party in
interest").
229Idaho Potato Commission v. M&M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003).
21)Id. at 132. The certification marks in question are the word "IDAHO" in a distinctive font and the
phrase "GROWN IN IDAHO" written inside an outline of the boundaries of the state of Idaho. Id.
231 Id. at 132.
2'2Id. at 133.
2" Id. at 134.
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remanded the case, finding that M & M could not be contractually estopped from
challenging the IPC's certification marks. 234 M & M had counterclaimed that the
IPC's marks should be cancelled under the Lanham Act due to the IPC's
discriminatory refusal to certify potatoes grown in Idaho, and the court found that
the public interest in free and open competition justified this challenge. 235 According
to the court, "the difference between the public interests in certification marks and
trademarks compels [this] result. 236
3. Similarities between cases
As shown by the above cases, geographic indications as such are not all
protected by the same legal theory in the United States. Even after 1946, not every
American case addressing the geographic origin of foodstuffs was based on claims
brought under the same provisions of the Lanham Act. Instead, some of these cases
refer to other protections provided under federal law for geographic indications,
whether these protections are the narrower provisions of trademark law or the
broader protections against false advertising. In the United States, therefore,
producers do not consider Section 4 of the Lanham Act to provide the only federal
protections of geographic indications. Along with the multitude of possible state
claims,237 a variety of federal claims also emerged after 1946.
Yet there are two similarities even among the very different cases discussed
above. First, governmental involvement is extremely limited in the protection of
geographical designations. Second, the rhetoric in these cases is quite similar to that
in earlier American cases in its effort to strike a balance between consumer and
producer protection.
a. Public involvement
In all of these cases, governmental bodies play quite a limited role. Even in
Montrachet, the one case in which the Patent and Trademark Office made an
appearance after having denied trademark registration due to alleged genericization,
this federal agency was required to meet
a significant burden of proof and the court
238
showed little deference to its findings.
As for states, the only case in which a state actually played a role is Washington
Potato Commission, in which the State of Idaho was found to be no more than a
"nominal party." 239 The IPC, a state agency, did bring suit in two cases, but this
involvement was not itself direct state intervention. In Washington Potato
Commission, in fact, the IPC was found to be "an independent self-governing state
214

Id. at 141.
2"S
Id. at 133, 138.
236Id. at 138 ("Significantly, trademark owners are granted a monopoly over their marks and can

choose to license the marks to others on whatever conditions they deem appropriate, so long as confusion
does not result. The same is not true of certification marks. Certification mark licensing programs are a
form of limited compulsory licensing.. and the certifier has a duty to certify the goods or services of any
person who meets the standards and conditions which the mark certifies.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
237 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 198-204.
211 See 878 F.2d 375, 377 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
2
'9 410 F.Supp. 171, 175 (D. Idaho 1975).
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agency [that is] financially independent and does not perform an essential
governmental function. ,,2111 In other cases, although states could be seen as having
commercial interests in the issues at hand, no states intervened. The State of Hawaii
was not involved in shielding its producers from misuse of the term "Kona" for
coffee, nor did foreign states play any role in Montrachet or Faehndrich.
This low level of governmental involvement can be explained in two different
ways, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. First, the United States is
generally less comfortable with state regulation than other industrialized nations.
While other countries have accepted significant welfare states, America has
historically disfavored such a level of state involvement. The United States is also
seen as favoring private litigation over regulation, 24 1 again evidencing a discomfort
with state involvement that could partially explain the almost purely private nature
of these suits. Second, the low level of state involvement in America also reveals the
country's greater degree of comfort with federalism. Although states' rights debates
maintain currency in the United States, the federal government has also exerted its
authority for over two hundred years, meaning that the overall concept of federalism
is fairly uncontroversial in the U.S. American states, having accepted federalism
centuries before, exhibit little concern over the Lanham Act's potential to threaten
their sovereignty, and the Patent and Trademark Office feels little need to prove its
legitimacy by playing an active role in registration.
b. Consumer-producer rhetoric
A second internal similarity aligning these cases is their use of both consumer
and producer rhetoric to justify protection of geographic indications. This rhetorical
equilibrium was established even before the Lanham Act, in Newark Cheese Co. and
Mod-Urn Cheese Packing Co. In these cases, New York's Supreme Court validated
242
the court's protection of "Roquefort" by referring to the producers' sales losses
and condemning the infringers for "enriching themselves at the plaintiff's
expense." 243 The court also, however, justified its findings based on protection of the
public against deception 244 and imposition. 245 Such rhetoric continued throughout the
cases referring to geographic indications. While the Montrachet court focused
slightly more on consumers, basing a determination of genericization on the
purchasing public and defining a trademark's function as "so identify[ing] a product
that the consumer is assured of the quality and characteristics that it has come to
associate with a particular source of that product," 246 the Sugai Products court
emphasized producers by requiring "discernibly competitive injury" for
241Id.
24

1See. e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law 3 (2000) ("The
United States more often relies on lawyers, legal threats, and legal contestation in implementing public
policies, compensating accident victims, striving to hold governmental offices accountable, and resolving
business disputes").
242 Douglas v. Newark Cheese Co.. 274 N.Y.S. 406.411 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1934).
243 Douglas v. Mod-Um Cheese Packing Co., 290 N.Y.S. 368, 369 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1936).
244Newark Cheese Co., 274 N.Y.S. at 413 ("...they must not indulge in acts which will deceive the
public into buying the substitute as the original Roquefort").
215Mod-Urn Cheese Packing Co., 290 N.Y.S. at 369 (referring to the "'imposition upon the cheesepurchasing public").
246878 F.2d 375, 376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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infringement.247 Of the American cases discussed above, the court in Washington
Potato Commission was the only one not to use such producer-consumer rhetoric,
primarily because the focus in that case was the justice of exercising personal
jurisdiction over certain defendants. American federal courts thus enforce the
protection of geographic indications both in order to protect consumers from
misleading labeling and in order to protect producers from potential free-riders.
Although most cases studied here did not explicitly refer to quality, this
consumer-producer rhetorical balance suggests that U.S. courts view protection of
geographic indications as a form of quality control. Such an interpretation is
supported by the Lanham Act itself, which permits certification mark registrants to
establish the standards producers must meet before becoming eligible for
licensing. 24 Given that these specifications can include more than merely
geographic origin, geographical indications in the United States protect consumers
and producers alike by guaranteeing a level of quality in foodstuffs in addition to
guaranteeing their actual origin.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN
ENFORCEMENT OF GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS
In both the United States and the European Union, states and Member States
have ceded much control over the protection of geographically-significant foodstuffs
to a federal scheme that coexists with the international protections provided under
the TRIPS Agreement. While EU Member States have retained criminal provisions
on false labeling such as those under which Dante Bigi was charged, the decision of
the European Court of Justice in Salaisons d'Auvergne effectively forbids any
national protection regime as a violation of the principle of the free movement of
goods now that an EU-wide regime exists. In the United States, states have also
retained certain criminal provisions, 249 but they too25are prohibited from passing any
regulations that would impede interstate commerce. 0
Despite the similar federal nature of the Lanham Act and 2081/92, however,
these two regimes and their associated caselaw exhibit significant differences, which
this section will examine in turn. First, the European Union and the United States
have approached geographic indications of foodstuffs from markedly different
angles, with the former establishing a comprehensive list and the latter deeming
these designations to be i subset of trademark law. Second, the European approach
implicates public involvement much more than does the American version, both in
the registration process itself and litigation addressing geographic indications.
2111997 WL 824022 I. II (D. Haw. 1997).

248See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
249See supra text accompanying notes 198-204.
-"'Dormant commerce clause jurisprudence suggests that a statute forbidding the importation of
certain foodstuffs due to the protection of geographic indications would be found to run afoul of An. I § 8
cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.. Inc. v. Cottrell. 424 U.S. 366,
371-72 (1976) ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose
is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will
of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.") (internal citations omitted).
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Finally, cases resolving disputes over geographic indications suggest that, while both
entities have attempted to strike a balance between competition policy and
intellectual property, the European Union is less willing than the United States to
follow a robust competition policy in the protection and enforcement of geographic
indications of foodstuffs. As will be addressed at the end of this section, these broad
differences between the European and American approaches have important
consequences for views of federalism on either side of the Atlantic, as well as for the
balance struck between producer and consumer protection.
A. Legal Frameworks
Although both entities have succeeded at using federal law to create collective
monopolies that shield a group of foodstuff producers from competition, each has
done this through a very different legal framework. In the United States, geographic
indications of foodstuffs are seen as a subset of trademark law, while the European
Union protects these designations by way of a comprehensive list. Roquefort, for
example, is protected in America by way of U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 571,798, a
certification mark that requires any product so labeled to be a cheese that "has been
manufactured from sheep's milk only, and has been cured in the natural caves of the
Community of Roquefort, Department of Aveyron, France." 251 This mark carries
with it both the remedies for infringement specified in § 32 of the Lanham Act252 and
a recognition of the label as the intellectual property of the mark owner, here the
Community of Roquefort. In Europe, Roquefort is also protected, but there it is by
way of its listing in Registration 1107/96. This listing, along with the associated
standards that are on file with the Commission, neither creates a specific remedy nor
conveys the idea of actual ownership on the part of the Community of Roquefort.
Registration does, however, grant a protection that is explicitly restricted to
foodstuffs.
B. Public Involvement
While both the Lanham Act and 2081/92 authorize private litigation, they do so
within the context of public regulation. As outlined previously, both Section 4 of the
Lanham Act and 2081/92 coexist with criminal provisions that provide for public53
litigation against certain forms of misuse or violation of geographic indications.2
Despite the fact that both approaches aim to balance the public and the private,
however, the U.S. and the EU arrived at very different equilibriums. In the European
Union, registration of geographic indications is much more dynamic than its
American counterpart. In Europe, the Commission is granted six months to verify an
application for registration, during which any interested persons or Member States
may also object. 254 In the U.S., in contrast, the Patent and Trademark Office appears
to play a much more passive role. Although the Office must approve an application

U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 571,798, available at http://www.uspto.gov/ (last visited Feb. 13,

251

2004).
252
See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
259See supra notes 80 and 194 and accompanying text.
254See supra text accompanying note 55.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. I11

255
for a certification mark, approved marks are only open to objection for thirty days.
The American registration process thus appears to be a process more strictly limited
to private players than does its European counterpart.
The case law on geographic indications highlights this disparity between the
extent of governmental involvement in the two processes. As shown by cases such as
Feta, Consorzio, Exportur and Bigi, the Commission itself plays an active role in
litigation, whether as an intervening party protecting the interests of the European
Union or as a defendant. The Member States also play a significant role in cases
brought before the ECJ. Whether suing the Commission for incorrectly registering a
geographic indication or intervening to protect national interests they believed to be
threatened, Member States are sufficiently involved in litigation to give European
litigation over geographic indications a notably public character.
In the American cases studied in Part III, in contrast, the involvement of the
Patent and Trademark Office was limited to its role as defendant in Montrachet,
where an applicant 256
appealed the office's rejection of its mark to the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board. Unlike the Commission, the Patent and Trademark Office did
not intervene to publicize its interests in cases addressing certification marks issued
for geographic indications. Nor do states play nearly as large a role in the protection
of geographic indications as do Member States. In fact, when the state of Idaho did
attempt to bring a more public character to civil litigation under Section 4 of the
Lanham Act by acting as plaintiff, the federal court discounted the state's
involvement as 257
"nominal" and found the Idaho Potato Commission to be the real
party in interest.
This differential state involvement can be partially explained by differences in
civil procedure. Under the preliminary reference procedure, a case that is referred to
the ECJ by a national court under Article 234 of the EC Treaty must be distributed to
all Community institutions and Member States for possible intervention before being
considered by the Court. 258 Although not required by the Treaty, the Commission
has established the policy of intervening in all preliminary references. 259 No such
procedure exists in the United States to make intervention easier for either the Patent
and Trademark Office or any states, leading to their comparatively low level of
involvement in the protection of geographic indications through the court system.

C. Principlesof Competition Policy and Intellectual Property
In both Europe and America, the protection of geographic indications pits two
modern legal doctrines against one another: the competition principle of preventing
monopolies and the protection of intellectual property. By limiting the right to use a
255See "What Happens Next?," at http://www.uspto.gov/web/trademarks/workflow/next.htm (last
visited January 17, 2004) (outlining the process for registering a trademark). Any party that believes it
may be damaged by the mark has thirty days in which to object or request to extend this objection period.
Id.

256See In. re Montrachet S.A., 878 F.2d 375, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).'
257Idaho Potato Commission v. Washington Potato Commission, 410 F.Supp. 171, 175 (D. Idaho

1975).

258TEC Art. 234.
25'This policy decision is not codified in any regulation or Treaty provision, but it is firmly
established in the Legal Service of the European Commission, according to Jean-Franqois Verstrynge,
former Director-General for the Environment.
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geographic indication, which would otherwise be freely available to all producers of
the implicated foodstuff, to certain producers who meet specific requirements, both
certification marks and registrations under 2081/92 create a collective monopoly that
may initially appear to violate competition principles. However, by prohibiting
exclusive control over these designations, these two schemes strike a balance
between protecting intellectual property and preventing exclusive monopolies. By
creating a collective monopoly within which actual competition is possible, both the
European Union and the United States have made the decision to provide producers
with only partial protection from competition.
This desire to strike a balance between these two conflicting doctrines is
highlighted in the rhetoric of American and European courts alike in cases dealing
with geographic indications. While a balance in favor of competition principles
would be on the whole more likely to refer to consumer protection, mentioning
consumers' interest in having a wide selection of products not controlled by one or
two dominant producers, a balance in favor of intellectual property would likely
refer to the interests of producers in protecting their initial investment and being
shielded from free-riders. 260 In all of the cases referred to in Parts II and III,
however, the courts consciously referred to both consumers and producers, often
focusing on quality before all else. Such rhetoric suggests that, when deciding cases
dealing with geographic indications, the ECJ and U.S. federal courts have interpreted
the purposes behind 2081/92 and the Lanham Act as protecting both competition and
intellectual property rather than clearly favoring one over the other.
Despite these rhetorical similarities, a closer look at the cases interpreting these
different regimes suggests that the European Union and the United States actually do
differ in the balance they have found between competition and intellectual property.
As the courts have permitted these schemes to be implemented, Europe appears to
favor intellectual property protection while America is more willing to prioritize
competition principles, which corresponds to historical differences in competition
enforcement between Europe and America.
The United States has always prioritized competition principles more highly
than other countries, as shown by their early codification into American law with the
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.261 And, while the European Union included
262
commentators have argued that it
strong competition provisions in the EC Treaty,
was not particularly active in competition enforcement until 1990, when its

26This is. of course, a gross simplification. Competition principles can also be couched in terms
favorable to producers, referring to the interest of potential new entrants into the market, and intellectual
property protection can refer to consumers' interest in having the quality of their products guaranteed by
limiting the market to certain producers. Overall, however, a consumer focus is normally associated with
competition and a producer focus is normally associated with intellectual property. See, e.g., Why (and
How) Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1817, 1858 (2003) (promoting a
compromise between -'the consumer-oiented antitrust laws and the more producer-oriented intellectual

property laws").
2" Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr.. The Evolving Architecture of International Law: The Global Antitrust
Explosion: Safeguarding Trade and Commerce or Runaway Regulations?, 26 Fletcher f. World Aff. 59,
59 (2002).
262See TEC Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82 (ex 86). See generally Anu Piilola. Assessing Theories of
Global Governance: A Case Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 Stan. J. Int'l L. 207, 227
(2003) ("European Community.. competition law is the only example of a far-reaching, supranational
competition architecture at the regional level. The E.U. Member States have, to a significant extent, ceded
their sovereignty to this supranational body.").
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competition rules changed to require pre-notification of major acquisitions. 263 The
goals of U.S. and EU competition policies have also been seen as quite different,
with American competition laws encouraging the efficient functioning of markets
and maximizing consumer welfare and European competition laws also2 64addressing
issues such as distributional effects, fairness and market integration.- Recently,
however, the EU has become much more activist in this arena, approaching and even
surpassing the U.S. in its enforcement of competition. 265 As will be seen below,
however, the passage and implementation of 2081/92 do not fit neatly into this
historic trend. While the EU has become more willing to consider competition
principles in recent years, the protection of geographic indications requires it do so at
the expense of another fundamental value of the European Union - intellectual
property protection, or, in the words of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, "the protection
of industrial and commercial property. 266 In passing 2081/92, the Council showed
itself to be unwilling to prioritize competition principles above all others.
While the Lanham Act also struck a balance between competition principles and
intellectual property, the caselaw interpreting certification marks appears far more
willing to consider the former than do the cases before the ECJ. In M & M, for
example, a U.S. court strongly enforced the principle of universal licensing under the
Lanham Act. By refusing to permit a former licensee of the certification mark for
Idaho potatoes to contract away its right to challenge the IPC's licensing of the mark,
the court highlighted the importance of protecting competition principles within the
Lanham Act's provisions for certification marks. Were IPC permitted to
contractually estop M & M from challenging its allegedly discriminatory licensing
practices, one of the major benefits of certification marks - their creation of a
collective monopoly that must be opened up to any producer who meets the holder's
requirements - would no longer exist.
The cases before the ECJ, however, did not establish any such prioritization of
competition principles. Instead, although 2081/92, like the Lanham Act, provides for
universal licensing, its actual implementation appears to be quite favorable to
producers and to permit the existence of a very limited collective monopoly. While
the Court recognized concerns about a registration under 2081/92 granting monopoly
power to too small a group of producers when it struck down the protected
geographic indication at issue in Feta, other cases were decided much more clearly
in favor of intellectual property protection. In Consorzio, the Court upheld the
registration of a geographic indication that required producers not only to produce
the Prosciutto di Parma in the region of production, but to slice and package this
foodstuff in the region of production as well. 267 By permitting a geographic
indication to be so specific, the Court effectively permitted the supposedly universal
licensing of 2081/92 to be limited to a very narrow group of potential producers.
263Lipsky, supra note 261, at 60.

264Piilola, supra note 262, at 223.
26-1
See Lipsky, supra note 261, at 59 (referring to the European Commission's 1997 near-rejection of
the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and its refusal to approve the GE-Honeywell merger in 2001.
despite approval of the latter by the United States).
266TEC Article 30.
267See Consorzio del Prosciutto de Panna 2003 E.C.R. 00 at ruling (interpreting 2081/92 "as not

precluding the use of a protected designation of origin from being subject to the condition that operations
such as the slicing and packaging of the product take place in the region of production, where such a
condition is laid down in the specification").
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A further narrowing of 2081/92 was shown in Bigi, where the ECJ found that
the derogation procedure was not as permissive as it at first appeared. In that ruling,
the Court held that the producers who were permitted to use a registered designation
for a finite period after the passage of 2081/92 did not include producers in the
country of production, regardless of whether or not they had been producing the
foodstuff in the past. Instead, this derogation only applied to producers who had
previously produced the foodstuff and who operated in a Member State other than
the country of production.
D. Broader Lessons of ComparativeDifferences
These above broad differences, as exhibited in both the protection regimes and
the cases interpreting them, provide two fundamental lessons in comparative U.S.
and EU law that extend beyond the smaller lens of geographic indications of
foodstuffs. As will be discussed in Part IV(D)(1), the protection of these
designations reveals significant differences in the perception and acceptance of
federalism in Europe and America. Also, as will be discussed in Part IV(D)(2),
differences in protection highlight the relative differences in producer protection
favored by these two entities.
1. Federalism
When the Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel Community
("ECSC") in 1951, many commentators were quick to envision a "United States of
Europe., 268 As the European Union has expanded in both competence and
membership from its predecessor, however, it has become increasingly clear that the
EU is a unique supranational body, with a quasi-federal structure that is far different
from that established in the United States over two centuries ago. Although both the
EU and the U.S. have approached protection of geographic indications through
federal legislation, the many differences listed above highlight just how differently
these two entities view federalism.
While Commission policy under Article 234 can explain that institution's
involvement in the cases outlined in Part II, Member State involvement in cases such
as Canadane, Feta, Consorzio, Exportur and Bigi requires further explanation. As
mentioned in Part II, this involvement highlights the continuing willingness of
Member States to protect their national interests from what they perceive as the
negative effects of the European Union. 269 Although initially willing to support the
passage of 2081/92, Member States are clearly uncomfortable with the federalizing
aspect of this regulation when it appears to contravene their national interests. Unlike
in the United States, where over two centuries of federalism have led to state
acceptance of legislation such as the Lanham Act and its consequences, EU Member
States are evidently still coming to terms with the fact that the benefits of a Europewide approach to geographic indications can bring with them associated threats to

268See, e.g., Draft Resolution of the United States Senate, January 1952, Box 1667. Harry S. Truman
papers, available at Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO (referring to "a United States of
Europe" collaborating with the United States of Anierica).
269See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
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their national interests.27° While one of the U.S. cases studied, Washington Potato
Commission, did involve a state intervening to protect its interests, such state
involvement was deemed unacceptable by the court. The ECJ, however, has not
disallowed such involvement, thus highlighting the striking mix of national and
supranational concerns that still interact within the European Union, regardless of
quasi-federal regulations such as the registration system under 2081/92.
This continuing uncertainty regarding federalization is also shown by the greater
politicization of the protection of geographic indications that occurs in the European
Union relative to the United States. In cases such as Bigi and Feta, genericness
became more than merely a technical question. In Bigi, the involvement of Member
State governments transformed the issue of the genericness of parmesan cheese into
a conflict between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Italy on the other. In
Feta, a similar issue became even more of a political struggle, with Denmark, France
and Germany all questioning the Commission's competence in registering feta
cheese as a geographic indication and thus at least partially bringing the entire
supranational registration system into question. E.xportur, Canadane and Consorzio
also highlight the political nature of the protection of geographic indications in that
they all address whether such protection exceeds the authority granted to Community
institutions by the EC Treaty.
The protection of geographic indications in the United States does not appear to
have nearly as much of a political character. The cases outlined in Part III center on
the protection of geographic indications - no more and no less. While the plaintiff
cheese producer in Montrachet was French, the case says nothing that would suggest
that the Patent and Trademark Office had political motivations in rejecting its
application for the certification mark. Nor did Faehndrich appear to be addressing
any issues of Franco-American diplomacy or trade; instead, the case at issue truly
did revolve around Faehndrich's misuse of a registered certification mark. And,
although M&M Produce Farm & Sales was a New York company, M&M did not
center on conflicts between New York and Idaho. While the case between the Idaho
Potato Commission and the Washington Potato Commission may have had an
element of state commercial rivalry to it, Washington Potato Commission still
primarily focused on the misuse of a registered certification mark, and was also
eventually dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
A further example of the European Union's lower level of comfort with federal
authority can be seen in the lack of specific remedies available under 2081/92.
Whereas the protection of geographic indications through the Lanham Act led to the
provision of actual remedies - both injunctive and monetary - for infringement,
2081/92 lists no such remedies, instead delegating this determination to national
courts. The combination of this national resolution of remedies and the generally
high level of Member State involvement means that private parties in Europe often
still experience the federal power of the European Union through their Member
States, whereas private parties in America, where federalism is a far more accepted
doctrine, experience this more directly.

271'This argument is furthered by the facts of Salaisons d'Auvergne, where France attempted to
maintain a separate national regime for geographic indications. See supra text accompanying notes 10408.
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2. Protection of producers and consumers
A further dissimilarity highlighted by the many differences between 2081/92
and the Lanham Act is the relatively greater protection that the European Union
appears to offer to its producers. The clearest example of this distinction was the
European prioritization of intellectual property over competition policy discussed
above, but other aspects of these two regimes support this thesis as well.
Although the U.S. approach of placing geographic indications under the rubric
of trademark law would appear to be more favorable to producers than Europe's
approach, in that trademark law both provides a defined remedy and recognizes
geographic indications as the intellectual property of a producer, a closer look at the
actual application of the Lanham Act shows that this is not as producer-driven as it
would at first appear. While trademarks, such as that at issue in Montrachet, do
create exclusive property rights vested in one specific producer, such as Montrachet
S.A., certification marks do not. In fact, as addressed above, certification mark
owners are not permitted to produce or distribute the protected good. 27! In Europe,
although producers may not be provided specific federal remedies, they are
permitted to act affirmatively to register their foodstuffs under 2081/92272 and, as
shown by the cases above, state courts have been willing to accept the Council's
delegation and create remedies of their own.
A further example of Europe's preferential treatment of producers can be seen in
its prioritization of geographic indications vis-A-vis other intellectual property rights.
As other commentators have previously argued, the European Union approach to the
protection of geographic indications is quite different from that used in many other
parts of the world. While TRIPS Article 16(1) prioritizes an earlier trademark against
a later geographic indication, allowing the trademark owner to enforce its mark
against a subsequent producer who attempts to register the mark as a geographic
indication, 2081/92 establishes the opposite hierarchy. 273 In Europe, this earlier
trademark would continue to exist, but it would lose its exclusivity upon its
under 2081/92 and would thus permit new
registration as a geographic indication
74
competitors to enter the market.
The greater level of public involvement in Europe also provides advantages to
producers. Since Member State involvement in the cases outlined in Part III was on
behalf of those Member States' national producers, producers trying to protect a
geographic indication have more advocates - and more involved advocates, due to
the politicization discussed above - than do their counterparts in the United States.
Finally, the European Union's approach to genericization is far more producerfriendly than is that of the United States. In the European Union, once a geographic
indication is registered under 2081/92, it can never become generic. 275 Thus, while
such a designation may not confer an exclusive monopoly, it does confer a perpetual
monopoly on a collectivity of producers, regardless of whether their product loses its
15 U.S.C. §1054.
212See 208 1/92, Art. 5(1).
273See Goebel, supra note 15. at 975.
211See id. at 973-94 ("...the European Communities traditionally pursue a concept of geographic
indications protection which assumes a certain element of superiority of geographic indications over
trademarks").
271 See

2152081/92, Art. 13(3).
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specific character in the eyes of consumers. In the United States, in contrast, the
registration of a certification mark can be cancelled if the product becomes
generic. 276 Although such cancellation has not actually taken place in recent years
due to a lack of funding, this provision still highlights the different approaches that
the United States and Europe take in protecting geographic indications. In Europe, a
registered geographic indication confers unending protection on its producers,
regardless of consumer perceptions of the foodstuff. In America, registration only
provides protection until the designation has become a "common descriptive name,"
after which producers lose any protection for their initial investment or goodwill.
Apart from the absence of specific forms of relief in 2081/92, it appears that
manufacturers of foodstuffs from protected geographical areas are more favorably
treated under the European approach. And, given that national courts have not
foreclosed the possibility of granting injunctive relief in cases addressing the
infringement of a geographic indication, even the area of remedies does not appear
to eliminate this preferential treatment, thus meaning that producers would likely
prefer the EU registration system over the American system of certification marks.
V. CONCLUSION
The overarching similarities between the protection of geographic indications
for foodstuffs in the European Union and the United States are striking, particularly
given the many other approaches available. These entities could have permitted
broad protection based only on geography, regardless of quality, or they could have
established a high burden of proof or limited the available remedies to proven money
damages. They could have relied on Member State laws, or made a definitive choice
between producer protection or entirely free competition. Instead, both chose a fairly
similar path. In both the European Union and the United States, protection of
geographic indications acts as a quality-control measure, with registrants and
certification mark owners able to restrict use of their labels to producers meeting
more requirements than just geographical provenance. Although the relief provided
to registrants under 2081/92 depends on national law, courts in both Europe and
America have granted injunctive relief to parties affected by infringement of
protected geographical names, thus not requiring the showing of damages that would
be required were relief limited to monetary compensation. Both entities have chosen
to approach this protection at a federal level, preempting more local protection and
providing for a combination of public regulation and private judicial enforcement.
Finally, Europe and America have both chosen to create collective monopolies,
which offer a fairly unique solution to the choice between shielding producers from
competition and promoting efficient markets by only partially accepting each of
these seemingly contradictory goals.
Given these similarities, this Note has studied these two systems from a
comparative perspective in order to highlight the larger lessons that can be learned
from the different European and American approaches. Comparison of 2081/92 and
the Lanham Act, and the judicial enforcement of each, sheds light on two broad
areas of difference between the European Union and the United States. First, such an
evaluation reveals the different approaches that these two entities take to federalism.
276See supra text accompanying notes 189-91.
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While EU Member States have become increasingly comfortable with regulation and
administration at a supranational level, such comfort is far from unequivocal.
Although they were willing, in 1992, to support the passage of a supranational
registration system for geographic indications for foodstuffs, this support has not
remained unquestioned. Instead, when registration under 2081/92 fails to protect
national producers or threatens to upset Member States' preferred institutional
balance within the European Union, Member States have been quite willing to
challenge this system before the ECJ. Unlike in the United States, where
controversies over certification marks implicate primarily commercial interests,
European debates over geographic indications have a decidedly political feel. Yet, as
shown by the cases before the ECJ that address these designations, this uneasiness
with federalism is not sufficient to topple the supranational regime of 2081/92.
Instead, while Member States and EU institutions continue to be more willing than
their American counterparts to question federal regulation of geographic indications,
the ECJ has upheld this system and thus forged ahead with integration despite the
lingering concerns of the Union's members.
The second area in which comparison of these systems proves quite revealing is
the different treatment of producers and consumers. While both the ECJ and the
American federal courts have attempted to strike a balance between consumer and
producer rhetoric in their cases addressing geographic indications, the actual
outcomes of these cases, as well as the outlined requirements of 2081/92 and Section
4 of the Lanham Act, reveal that the European Union acts much more preferentially
toward producers of geographically-significant foodstuffs than does the United
States. In effect, the rhetoric of consumer protection acts as a screen for Europe's
actual practice of shielding producers from competition. This finding in turn
suggests that Europe, as has been true historically, is less willing to guarantee
competitive markets than is America.
Two different explanations may account for the higher level of producer
protection in the EU. First, food has historically occupied a higher level in Europe
than in America, meaning that protection for producers of quality foodstuffs is less
likely to be controversial in European countries. This traditional respect for quality
ingredients bridges the divide from plate to politics, and is evidenced in everything
from the focus on seasonal ingredients in French and Italian cooking to the current
debate over genetically modified organisms. 277 A second explanation, however, may
lie in Europe's looser form of federalism. As shown by the continued challenges to
supranational exercises of EU authority, federalism in the European Union still
requires support from Member States and their citizens. In approaching the treatment
of geographic indications, the European Union has strengthened the allegiance of
producers by providing them with strong protection. The United States, in contrast,
does not need to shore up such political support for federalism and thus has not felt
the need to cater to localized interests to the same degree.
This interplay between federalism and producer protection raises questions for
the future harmonization of the protection of geographic indications for foodstuffs. If
the TRIPS Agreement is expanded to provide greater protection to foodstuffs than
277See Roger Cohen, Schroder Visits Bush Today, Bearing Europe's New Concerns. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 29. 2001, at A9 (quoting German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder's chief diplomatic adviser as saying,
"We are very concerned about the environment, where we see different values. And about food, where the
attachment to quality and opposition to genetically modified products is very strong in Europe.").
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that currently available under Article 22, negotiators must be aware of the many
ramifications involved in choosing between a registration system modeled after the
EU regime and a trademark system modeled after that of the United States.
Alongside issues such as remedies and compatibility with other areas of the law, the
selection between these two options could also have consequences for the EU itself.
Were a U.S.-style approach chosen, would this necessarily be more favorable to
consumers than the EU's current system? And would this in turn lead to the already
weak support for EU federalism becoming even shakier? While these questions are
beyond the reach of this Note, this comparative study has shown that the protection
of geographic indications of foodstuffs raises many more issues than just variations
in attitudes toward the importance of quality ingredients. Instead, this area provides a
lens into much greater concerns that must be seriously considered as part of any
future attempt at international harmonization.

